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Abstract
The thesis of this Article is that arbitration should become the default mode of resolution
of international commercial disputes. In Part I, I first address the critical issue of the legitimacy
of international arbitrators. In the traditional model of voluntary arbitration, the legitimacy of
arbitrators flows from the agreement of the parties. By agreeing to have their dispute settled
by way of arbitration, the parties have not only empowered the arbitrators, but also abided by
the power that they have conferred on them. In the model that I propose, however, arbitration
loses its contractual foundation. Would arbitrators also lose all legitimacy? In the absence of
any acceptance of the parties, can adjudicatory power be conferred on private individuals? In
Part II, I discuss the comparative legitimacy of courts and of arbitrators to settle international
commercial disputes, and find that the legitimacy of arbitrators is not lower than the legitimacy of
courts. I then turn to the more traditional critiques of arbitration. Legal scholars have long debated
the desirability of private adjudication. Many of them have concluded that its costs outweigh its
benefits, and that it is thus undesirable. In Part III, I argue that this critique assumes features
of the arbitral process which are peculiar to U.S. domestic arbitration, and which are thus not
necessary. I present recent developments in specialized fields of international arbitration and argue
that they indeed show that the costs of private adjudication have been overstated. Finally, in Part
IV, I build on the conclusions reached in the previous parts and frame the details of the proposed
model accordingly. Before discussing the theoretical foundation of the proposed model, however,
I begin this Article by sketching the advantages of arbitration over litigation. I show that, in an
international context, arbitration is a more suitable mode of dispute resolution, and that extending
its scope would actually improve the settlement of international commercial disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
Is arbitration the natural mode of resolution for interna-
tional business disputes? It is commonplace to state that the es-
sential features of the process make it the most suitable mode of
dispute resolution in this context:' neutrality and independence
of the adjudicators, seriousness and flexibility of the process,
higher prospects of enforceability of the decision in the majority
of the world's jurisdictions.2 It may also be that the development
of international trade has led to a significant increase in the
number of the cases resolved by way of arbitration. Even though
it is almost impossible to assess the number of cases that are arbi-
trated each year,3 as the process is both confidential and decen-
tralized, there is some anecdotal evidence that international
* Professor of Law, University of Luxembourg; J.D., Ph.D (Law), Panthton-Sor-
bonne University; LL.M., Yale. I am indebted to Lela Porter Love, W. Michael Reisman,
Kristen Boon, Michael Granne, Thomas Healy, Alan Scott Rau and the participants in
workshops at Charleston, Tulane and University of Colorado law schools and at the
Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University for commenting on earlier versions of
this Article. Many thanks also to Anna White. All errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, LOWENFELD ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION,
COLLECTED ESSAYS OVER THREE DECADES 143 (2005); BERNARD HANOTtAU, COMPLEX AR-
BITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTiCONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 5 (2005);
Charles N. Brower, Charles N. Brower II & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis in the
Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT'L 415, 440 (2003).
2. The advantages of the arbitral process are discussed in Part II and throughout
the Article. It may be useful to mention immediately for American readers unfamiliar
with international arbitration that it is quite different from U.S. domestic arbitration, in
particular in employment and consumer disputes.
3. Some scholars have nevertheless been able to propose estimates that ninety per-
cent of international contracts include an arbitration clause. See, e.g., CI-IRISTOPHER R.
DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAiMARK EDS., TowARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 59 (2005). A recent study has found that com-
mercial international contracts include arbitration clauses only in twenty percent of the
cases, but the data are barely more representative than the typical anecdotal evidence
which is used, as it only covered a couple hundred (270) international contracts. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study
of ex ante Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts 29 (Cornell Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-023, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=927423.
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commercial arbitration has exploded over the last forty years.
Some of the major international arbitral institutions report that
their caseload has increased dramatically. 4 Numerous specialists
of international arbitration report that they have witnessed a tre-
mendous development of the field,5 and even that "it has be-
come the dominant method of settling international trade dis-
putes. '"6 Even the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1985 that "[a]s
international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has
the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in
the course of that trade."
7
The suitability of the arbitral process to the resolution of
international commercial disputes is not only attested by its fea-
tures and the rise of arbitration. Several states have endorsed a
pro-arbitration policy. In the United States, the Supreme Court
has insisted for several decades on the existence of an "emphatic
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,"' and on "a
strong belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolu-
tion of international commercial disputes . . . ."' In France, as
will be discussed below, courts have applied an even more
favorable policy than in the United States, taking a variety of par-
ticularly liberal positions in favor of the arbitral process and
making France, by and large, probably the most welcoming juris-
diction in the world for international arbitration.'
The steps taken by many jurisdictions to liberalize their laws
4. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the
United States, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 233 (Suppl. 2006) (stating that the number of proceed-
ings administered by leading international institutions has doubled between 1993 and
2003, and even tripled for the American Arbitration Association).
5. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN
PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION lxxvii (1997); EMMANUEL GAILLARD
& JOHN SAVAGE EDS., FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 1 (1999); Brower et al., supra note 1, at 415-16.
6. TIBOR VARADY, JOHN J. BARCEL6 III & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION V (1999); see also W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Develop-
ments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 2
(1995) (referring to the "normalcy of international commercial arbitration"); ALAN
REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, LAW AND PRAC-
TICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (4th ed. 2004); GAILLARD & SAVAGE,
supra note 5, at 1.
7. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985).
8. Id. at 631.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part II.B.
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of arbitration11 certainly reflect to a certain extent a willingness,
if not an eagerness to attract as much arbitration as possible
within their borders in order to take advantage of the invisible
benefits that may come with this activity. There is clear competi-
tion at the international level between several jurisdictions in
this respect.1" In Europe, a match of giants opposes France and
Switzerland, with the United Kingdom as a runner-up. Judges in
each of these jurisdictions are very much aware of the moves
made in favor of arbitration by the courts of other jurisdictions,
and try to be at the forefront of the liberalization of arbitration.
Jurisdictions willing to enter into the market try to take radical
steps to market themselves.1 3
Although the economic interest of the jurisdictions in seek-
ing to attract arbitration may be an important factor in the
evolution of many arbitration laws in the world, this Article will
argue that another critical reason for the development of arbi-
tration is that it is perceived by many as the natural mode for the
resolution of international commercial disputes, and rightly so.
It is however paradoxical that a natural mode for the resolution
of any disputes not be, if not mandatory, which is exceptional in
a commercial context, at least a default solution. In other words,
one wonders why, if arbitration is the natural mode for the reso-
lution of international commercial disputes, it is not the default
solution when the parties have not provided for the mode of
resolution of their disputes and, in particular, have not included
a jurisdiction clause in their contract.
From a U.S. perspective, the situation appears even more
paradoxical as the Supreme Court never misses an occasion to
recall, indeed "emphatically," that arbitration is "favored" by
U.S. federal law.14 If it really were so, one would think that, in
the absence of any clear statement of the parties to an interna-
tional business transaction, U.S. law would not provide for the
11. See HANOTLAU, supra note 1, at 5; see also William W. Park, National Law and
Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L.
REv. 647, 694 (1989) (discussing the Belgian and the Swiss experiences).
12. Arthur T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in Private
International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Common- and
Civil-Law Systems, in REcUEIL DES Couas TOME 295, at 58 (2002).
13. For instance by allowing foreign parties to waive completely the possibility to
challenge an award made on their territory. See Park, National Law and Commercial Jus-
tice, supra note 11, at 694.
14. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
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jurisdiction of its courts, but would give assistance to the party
willing to initiate arbitration proceedings. The truth of the mat-
ter is that the so-called pro-arbitration policy of the Supreme
Court is essentially an anti-discrimination policy, providing for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements when they exist, ex-
actly as other agreements.
15
There are, however, jurisdictions which genuinely favor in-
ternational arbitration, and where arbitration agreements are
not enforced like other contracts, but more favorably. The most
advanced on that path is France. French law has now reached
the extreme position where arbitration agreements are deemed
valid and enforceable in all circumstances, irrespective of the
traditional requirements of the French law of contract, or in-
deed of any other law. 6 As will be developed below, the policy
reason behind this solution is that the contractual nature of arbi-
tration can be used strategically by defendants to delay and
sometimes avoid the arbitral process, and that a clear rule pro-
viding for the enforceability of arbitration agreements in all cir-
cumstances should be an efficient tool against such moves. The
contractual nature of international arbitration has thus begun to
appear to the French judiciary as an obstacle to the development
of international arbitration.
It could seem astonishing that the most essential feature of
arbitration, i.e., that it is a "creature of contract,"17 could appear
as an obstacle to its implementation. If arbitration was indeed
perceived as one alternative mode of dispute resolution among
many others, but by no means a superior or more appropriate
one, then its contractual foundation should appear as the most
natural technique to allow the parties to choose it and to protect
them from being dragged into an alternative derogatory mode
of dispute resolution without seriously considering making that
unusual, out of the ordinary, choice. That is why one way to
15. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 440 (2006);
Hall Street Assoc., LLC v. Mattel Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1399 (2008). Once a core con-
sent to arbitration has been found, however, a number of presumptions on the scope of
consent kick in which are certainly favorable to arbitral jurisdiction. See generally Alan
Scott Rau, ArbitralJurisdiction and the Dimensions of 'Consent, 24 ARB. INr'L 199 (2008).
16. Municipalitl de Khoms El Mergeb v. Socit6 Dalico, Cass. le civ. (Fr.), Dec. 20,
1993, Bull. Civ. I, No. 1675, REV. ARB. 116, 117 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery and Confectionary Workers
Union, 430 U.S. 243, 251 (1977); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960).
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interpret an evolution like the French one that in effect negates
the contractual nature of arbitration is to see a critical shift in
paradigm. Far from remaining an alternative mode of dispute
resolution, the chosen mode (by the legal order) which does not
really need to be chosen (by the parties) becomes the natural
mode of dispute resolution. Because it does not appear any-
more as an unusual, out of the ordinary, way to resolve interna-
tional commercial disputes, there is much less need, if any, to
protect the consent of the parties to resort to it, and indeed to
actually find such consent. In case of doubt, it makes sense to
consider that the parties would actually agree to the natural
mode of dispute resolution of the community.
This Article, however, is not about French law. It does not
want to predict how the French law of arbitration will evolve. It
wants to address a more general and normative question.
Should arbitration become the natural mode of resolution of in-
ternational commercial disputes? Should it lose its contractual
foundation and become the default mode of dispute resolution
in international commercial matters? Is it a good idea? Is it fea-
sible? The central issue of the Article is not even primarily one
of international arbitration, but rather one of international dis-
pute resolution. As states are far from being able to offer a via-
ble solution to resolve international private disputes in general
and international commercial disputes in particular, has the pri-
vate sector been able to develop an alternative solution? Inter-
national commercial arbitration is now a service which has
shown its efficacy. It could develop under the assumption that
states would control it and that only parties willing to resort to it
would undertake it. After forty years of success, however, it may
be time to ask whether that tool could be used to fulfill other
functions. Has the time come for the private sector to take over
the resolution of international commercial disputes and provide
this service to the international business community in a more
efficient way than states?
The thesis of this Article is that arbitration should become
the default mode of resolution of international commercial dis-
putes. In Parts II and III, I discuss what I have identified as the
most important arguments against the proposed model, and re-
spond to them.18
18. The Article is normative. Obviously, the proposed model could only be
2009]
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I first address the critical issue of the legitimacy of interna-
tional arbitrators. In the traditional model of voluntary arbitra-
tion, the legitimacy of arbitrators flows from the agreement of
the parties. By agreeing to have their dispute settled by way of
arbitration, the parties have not only empowered the arbitrators,
but also abided by the power that they have conferred on them.
In the model that I propose, however, arbitration loses its con-
tractual foundation. Would arbitrators also lose all legitimacy?
In the absence of any acceptance of the parties, can adjudicatory
power be conferred on private individuals? In Part II, I discuss
the comparative legitimacy of courts and of arbitrators to settle
international commercial disputes, and find that the legitimacy
of arbitrators is not lower than the legitimacy of courts.
I then turn to the more traditional critiques of arbitration.
Legal scholars have long debated the desirability of private adju-
dication. Many of them have concluded that its costs outweigh
its benefits, and that it is thus undesirable. In Part III, I argue
that this critique assumes features of the arbitral process which
are peculiar to U.S. domestic arbitration, and which are thus not
necessary. I present recent developments in specialized fields of
international arbitration and argue that they indeed show that
the costs of private adjudication have been overstated.
Finally, in Part IV, I build on the conclusions reached in the
previous parts and frame the details of the proposed model ac-
cordingly.
Before discussing the theoretical foundation of the pro-
posed model, however, I begin this Article by sketching the ad-
vantages of arbitration over litigation. I show that, in an interna-
tional context, arbitration is a more suitable mode of dispute res-
olution, and that extending its scope would actually improve the
settlement of international commercial disputes.
adopted by changing the existing law. It could be, however, that some legal doctrines
would constrain lawmakers and prevent them from implementing it. In most jurisdic-
tions, such doctrines would be constitutional in nature. For instance, there could be
constitutional rights of access to courts. The issue would then arise as to whether non-
consensual arbitration would jeopardize such rights. Constitutions could also provide
for the jurisdiction of courts, and prevent any stripping of such jurisdiction. Another
issue would then be whether non-consensual arbitration would amount to such jurisdic-
tion stripping. These issues will be addressed in a separate paper.
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I. WHY PROMOTE ARBITRATION
The essential aim of the Article is to discuss whether a non-
contractual model of arbitration is theoretically sound. Before
doing so, however, I would like to show that this discussion is not
only academic. Arbitration has important practical advantages
which make it a better mode for resolving international commer-
cial disputes. The proposed model would thus actually improve
international dispute resolution. I begin this Part by presenting
these advantages.
The practical relevance of the discussion is also attested by
the French experience. The French senior judiciary has reached
the conclusion that the contractual foundation of international
arbitration diminishes its efficacy, and has thus become an is-
sue.19 The reaction of courts is always very informative on the
problems faced by the community. French courts perceive that
there is a practical problem which needs to be addressed. I
briefly present the French experience in Section B.
A. Improving International Commercial Adjudication
1. A Critical Advantage: Enhancing Fairness
The most important advantage that arbitration offers is a
fairer process.2z The arbitral process is fairer in two ways. First
and foremost, the adjudicator is more neutral. Second, the par-
ties are put on a more equal footing.
a. Neutrality
The reason that probably best explains the success of inter-
national commercial arbitration is the fear of the home town ad-
vantage.2' Courts are not perceived as neutral when they decide
19. See generally GAILLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 409-30.
20. The surveys of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of arbitration
over litigation are numerous. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, Planning for International Dispute
Resolution, 17:3J. INT'L ARB. 61, 62-64 (2000); REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 24-32;
WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 389 (2007). Sev-
eral surveys were also conducted among practitioners. See CHRISTIAN BURHING-UHLE,
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 105 (2d ed. 2006); see generally
Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration-Corporate Attitudes and Practices-12 Perceptions
Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 525 (2004).
21. See, e.g., REISMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at lxxvii; LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 1;
Pierre Lalive, On the Neutrality of the Arbitrator and the Place of the Arbitration, in Swiss
ESsAYs ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 28 (1984). See also the survey conducted by M.
Burhing-Uhle between November 1991 and June 1992 which revealed that forum neu-
2009]
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disputes between locals and foreigners. It is well known that,
unfortunately, corruption is rampant in many jurisdictions of
the world. It is also well known that independence is not a lux-
ury many judiciaries can afford.2 2 In such cases, it is not even
clear that the mode of dispute resolution offered by the relevant
national courts may be properly termed adjudication. The game
has other rules, that the parties are free to follow if they so
wish.23 But if they would rather have a neutral and independent
third party decide their dispute, an alternative must be found.
There is no international commercial court.2 4 Arbitration seems
to be the only option. Of course, there are quite a few jurisdic-
tions where the judiciary is a truly independent power. As a re-
sult, it could be argued that another option is to litigate before
the courts of those jurisdictions.25 However, the superiority of
those courts, in this or in any other respect, would never be ac-
cepted by the parties originating from jurisdictions where courts
are not to be trusted. Moreover, judges in great democracies
may be independent, but still be capable of anti-foreigner bias.
If even a few instances of actual bias are made public, this will be
enough to create fear among all foreigners. Such cases will exist
trality was considered as one of the two most significant advantages of international
arbitration, together with higher prospects of enforcement internationally. See BuRH-
ING-UHLE, supra note 20, at 109.
22. The fear of the home town advantage concerns the ability of the adjudicator to
decide the dispute without bias. It is unconnected to the fear that the decision might
not be enforceable abroad. But seeJens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Com-
mercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L.R. 1, 33 (2008) (arguing that "the neutrality advantage
is a derivative of the enforceability advantage.").
23. Unless their law of origin does not allow them to, which is increasingly the case
with corruption. There are several international treaties which prohibit the bribery of
foreign officials. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/
21/0,2340,en2649201185201781311 11,00.html.
24. In some specialized fields, there have been calls for establishing one. See, e.g.,
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1617-18
(2005). For the time being, not only is there no prospect of establishment of such a
court, but it is unclear whether many states would want to commit to its jurisdiction. By
contrast, the proposed model would not require the establishment of any new institu-
tion. There are already many international arbitrators who could serve on the tribunals
that would need to be constituted.
25. See generally Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 22.
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in most legal orders.26 Sometimes, there will be less anecdotal
evidence, with the same devastating consequences.27 The only
workable solution is to find an alternative to national courts alto-
gether.2' This alternative is arbitration. As a private, non-na-
tional mode of dispute resolution, it does not raise any of the
concerns discussed so far. The arbitral tribunal is not a public
entity subject to the influence of any state. It will typically be
composed of private individuals who are nationals of different
states.
Moreover, it is also likely that arbitral tribunals are typically
more neutral culturally. Most courts are composed of individu-
als whose training, background and experience are overwhelm-
ingly national. 29 Even if they are willing to be open to foreign
customs, practices and realities, they are likely to see the world
through their cultural lenses. There will be many occasions to
misunderstand the facts and assume that what was not discussed
is not different from what they have personally experienced."'
By contrast, arbitrators sitting in an international panel are con-
stantly reminded of the international nature of the dispute and
the likelihood that the experiences of the other actors of the
26. For the United States, see, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, NAFIA Meets the American Torts
Process: O'Keefe v. Loewen, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69 (2000).
27. For the United States, see, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya et al., The Home Court Advan-
tage in International Corporate Litigation, 50J.L & ECON. 625 (2007) (recent survey finding
that foreigners lose more often in American courts than they win); see also Francesco
Guerrera & Brooke Masters, Foreign Companies Faring Worse in US Law Courts, FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 13, 2006, at 15. But see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1120, 1122-23 (1996) (survey showing
the opposite).
28. Actually, one could conceive that a given jurisdiction would accept to offer to
the world its courts as neutral and independent adjudicators for disputes unrelated to
any of the members of its community. The reason why mostjurisdictions would actually
not accept it is that the service would be funded by local taxpayers. See generally Dam-
mann & Hansmann, supra note 22 (arguing that court fees should be raised in order to
make extra-territorial litigation acceptable). However, the benefits for the legal profes-
sion could be so great that it would become beneficial. In England, this idea was likely
not foreign to the open court theory developed by Lord Denning. See The Atlantic Star,
[1973] QB 364, 382 ('You may call this 'forum-shopping' if you please, but if the forum
is England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the goods and the speed
of the service."). It is unlikely, however, that any given jurisdiction could deal with as
many disputes as arbitral tribunals do today. Furthermore, most of the other benefits of
arbitration (cultural openness, procedural flexibility) would be lost.
29. JACQUELINE NoLAN-HALEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CON-
SENSUAL ADR PROCESSES 51 (2005).
30. Id.
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process are essentially different. An international panel is there-
fore likely to be more open minded and thus to understand,
more often than not, the context of the disputes and the facts.
The private nature of arbitral tribunals, however, raises the
concern of another kind of bias. As the parties typically each
appoint one arbitrator, two out of the three members of the tri-
bunal can be suspected of wishing to favor the party who ap-
pointed them in order to be reappointed.3" Most arbitration
specialists, in particular experienced arbitrators, claim that this
rarely happens.3 2 Certainly, virtually all arbitration regimes pro-
vide that arbitrators are under a duty to be impartial.3 The
third arbitrator, who will often be the president of the tribunal,
will have no incentive to be partial, and it may then be that his
presence makes it difficult for the party-appointed arbitrators to
favor too zealously the interests of the party who nominated
them. Indeed, it is interesting to note that arbitral awards are
often unanimous. 4 However, such a hidden agenda of clientel-
ism cannot be excluded. "5 Yet, it must be emphasized that such
a problem does not concern the entire tribunal, but one of its
members. The third arbitrator, who will not have been ap-
pointed by one of the parties, will have no such bias. The other
party-appointed arbitrator will either be impartial, or be biased
towards the other party, thus canceling the bias of the first party-
appointed arbitrator. A world of unbiased arbitrators would be a
better world, but a world of biased arbitrators sitting in unbiased
tribunals is already a better world than the world of national
courts. Certainly, parties resorting to international arbitration
continue to draft arbitration clauses allowing them to each ap-
31. While it seems clear that arbitrators wish to be reappointed, the actual reason
may vary a great deal. For some, it will be the prospect of receiving additional fees.
However, specialists of international arbitration also act as counsels, and this typically
attracts more fees. See Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14:4J. INT'L ARB. 13, 14
(1997) (noting that their incentive seems to be to maintain or to enhance their reputa-
tion).
32. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 101.
33. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 33 (Eng.); United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, arts. 11-12 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law].
34. See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 5, at 959.
35. See LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 82 (reporting his experience in which the op-
posing party's arbitrator seemed too zealous in defense of the party who nominated
him).
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point one of the members of the tribunal.36 They rarely choose
to confer to a third party the power to appoint all the members
of the tribunal. While this may above all show that they want to
keep some control over the experience and the professionalism
of the tribunal, it also suggests that the incentives of individual
arbitrators are not important causes for concern.
b. Equality
Arbitration is also a fairer process because it offers procedu-
ral equality. Most arbitral regimes expressly provide that arbitra-
tors are under the obligation to treat the parties fairly and
equally. 7 More importantly, most national laws of international
arbitration allow the challenge of arbitral awards made in viola-
tion of procedural fairness.38 As awards cannot be challenged
on the merits in most jurisdictions, this ground has become very
important in practice. Experienced arbitrators know that losing
parties may rely on any procedural unfairness to try to challenge
the award, as typically they will have no other ground to chal-
lenge it. As a consequence, experienced arbitrators take proce-
dural fairness extremely seriously.39 Thus, the practice has de-
veloped to offer the most extensive procedural equality to the
parties. Each party is given the very same number of days to pre-
pare at each stage of the procedure. If one party is late by a few
days, the other party knows that the tribunal will award him the
exact same amount of extra time if he so requests. Parties are
also awarded the same time to argue their case, sometimes to the
minute. This may seem, and indeed is, quite formal, but it pre-
vents parties from even attempting to argue that they were not
on an absolute equal footing in the procedure. A consequence
36. See Paulsson, supra note 31, at 14.
37. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 33 (Eng.); Swiss Code on Private Inter-
national Law [hereinafter CPIL], art. 182(3) (1987) (Switz.), available at http://www.
umbricht.ch/pdf/swisspil.pdf. The obligation is also provided by numerous arbitration
rules. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Rules of Arbitration, art.
15(2) (1998), available at http://iccwbo.org/uploadedfiles/court/arbitration/other/
rules.arb.english.pdf; London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"), LCIA Arbi-
tration Rules, § 14.1 (Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcia.arbitration.com; UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 15(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15,
1976).
38. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 68 (Eng.); NCCP arts. 1502-04 (1981)
(Fr.); CPIL, art. 190(2) (1987) (Switz.).
39. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 488; see generally Park, National Law and Commer-
cial Justice, supra note 11.
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of the emphasis put on procedural equality is that national prac-
tices which do not comport perfectly with procedural equality
are banned.4 °
2. Two Other Advantages
In international disputes, the most important advantage of
arbitration is to offer a fairer adjudicatory process. But arbitra-
tion also has two other important advantages, which I present
below. It saves public resources, and it offers a process which is
more flexible.41
a. Saving Public Resources
The issue of the comparative cost of arbitration and litiga-
tion has traditionally been addressed from the perspective of the
litigants. This is because the goal of the authors who discuss the
comparative advantages of arbitration and litigation is to assess
whether the parties should decide to resolve their dispute by way
of arbitration, or not. Therefore, they logically take their per-
spective. However, it is probably unwise to generalize in this re-
spect. Arbitration can be cheaper or more expensive, depend-
ing on a variety of factors.4 2
If one takes the perspective of the state, however, the issue
becomes very different. Arbitration is a private mode of dispute
resolution, which is entirely funded by the litigants. As a result,
it obviously saves public resources. Arbitral tribunals decide dis-
40. For instance, the English practice of not addressing legal issues in written
pleadings ("skeleton of arguments") and waiting for the day before the hearing to send
the list of the cases relied upon, or the French practice of giving to the adjudicator, but
not the other party, oral pleadings notes (dossier de plaidoirie) at the end of the oral
argument. See GMALLARD & SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 707.
41. In any other survey of the comparative advantages of arbitration and litigation,
two additional advantages would typically be discussed: confidentiality and the higher
prospects of international enforcement of arbitral awards. However, the model that I
propose would not be confidential and would be unlikely to benefit from the 1958 New
York Convention. See infta Part IV.C-D. I thus do not discuss them as they would not
influence my model. I do not discuss either some perceived advantages which are now
hody disputed such as the cost and the speed of the process, or the reduction of forum
shopping. The practice of modern international arbitration has shown that it is unwise
to generalize in the respect of cost and speed and that arbitration has been able to
generate a good deal of parallel litigation. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 20, at 66; LOWEN-
FELD, supra note 1, at 3; Linda Silberman, International Arbitration: Comments from a
Critic, 13 Aai. REv. INT'L ARB. 9, 10 (2002).
42. BORN, supra note 20, at 66.
THE CASE FOR DEFA ULT ARBITRATION
putes which would have otherwise been decided by courts. In
many jurisdictions, public resources are scarce. Policies which
entail public resources savings are therefore likely to be particu-
larly appreciated by public policymakers. Diminishing the
docket of courts has certainly been a critical factor in the promo-
tion of alternative dispute resolution in many legal orders.43 It
demonstrates that many public policymakers would regard this
consequence of the proposed model as critically important.
Yet, the desirability of a policy cannot be assessed by exam-
ining its direct effect on public resources only. If such policy
also entails costs, a cost-benefit analysis must be conducted in
order to determine whether the benefits outweigh the costs. As
far as the proposed model is concerned, two series of costs can
be identified. First, the private resolution of disputes shifts costs
from the state to the litigants. The litigation costs of the parties
increase." Second, courts serve functions other than dispute
resolution that private adjudicators may not serve, or at least not
as well. The proposed model may then entail societal costs. The
proposed model will only be beneficial if the benefits outweigh
the costs. I conduct this cost-benefit analysis in Part III, and con-
clude the costs entailed by the proposed model are limited and
that it is thus clearly beneficial. At this stage of the Article, I
would like to make a more limited point. Irrespective of my
findings and indeed of critiques of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, arbitration has been promoted in many legal orders for sev-
eral decades.45 This indicates that either the policymakers have
conducted a cost-benefit analysis and have also concluded that
the benefits outweigh the costs, or that saving public resources is
so important that they would rather ignore or bear the costs en-
tailed by private dispute resolution than stop promoting alterna-
tive dispute resolution. In any case, for those policymakers, sav-
ing public resources will be perceived as an important advantage
of the proposed model.
This advantage will be even bigger in legal orders where
public adjudication is more expensive. The costs of public adju-
dication are higher in some legal orders than in others. This
43. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the Costs
of Litigation?, 34 GATH. U. L. REV. 267, 269-70 (1985).
44. Id. at 270.
45. See generally VARADY, supra, note 6 ; REISMAN ET AL., supra note 5.
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may be so for a variety of reasons. Judges can obviously be paid
varying salaries. A different number of judges and staff may be
involved in the settlement of each dispute. The civil procedure
of each jurisdiction may lead judges to spend more or less time
on each case. This last difference may be the one which makes
the biggest difference. In the common law world, trials last sev-
eral weeks.4 6 Judges then draft lengthy decisions. In the civil law
world, even in important commercial cases, hearings can last less
than an hour.4 7 Judges will then typically draft much shorter de-
cisions. Unsurprisingly, judges in the common law tradition typi-
cally handle significantly fewer cases than judges in the civil law
tradition.48 It follows that, in those jurisdictions where adjudica-
tion is more expensive, saving public resources is likely to be a
very powerful argument. In those jurisdictions where adjudica-
tion costs less, it will be a less powerful argument. But arbitra-
tion will then be attractive in a way unknown to more expensive
jurisdictions: allowing the parties to design the arbitral process
in order to increase the resources dedicated to the settlement of
the dispute and improve the adjudicatory process.
b. Designing Process
The third advantage that arbitration offers is procedural
flexibility. The parties have the power to design the arbitral pro-
cess.4 9 They can determine the procedural rules which will be
applicable during the arbitration. This procedural flexibility can
be used in different ways. The parties may shape a process
which is only slightly different from the process of the court
which would have decided the dispute in the absence of an
agreement to arbitrate. But the parties may also wish to shape a
process which will be very different from the alternate judicial
46. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1665,
1672 (listing the differences between common-law and civil-law systems).
47. Id.
48. A striking and telling difference is the number of cases handled by supreme
courts. The French supreme court for private and criminal matters (Cour de cassation)
is composed of more than a hundred judges who handle more than 20,000 cases a year.
Common law supreme courts typically handle a hundred or less cases per year.
49. The power to determine the applicable procedural rules is provided by vir-
tually all arbitration laws and rules. See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 34 (Eng.);
NCCP, art. 1494 (2) (Fr.) (1981); CPIL, art. 182 (2) (Switz.); ICC, Rules of Arbitration,
art. 15(1) (1998).
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process, so much so that it may become almost as important an
advantage as the fairness of arbitral process.
The clearest example is how parties from jurisdictions
where fewer public resources are invested in the judicial process
may wish to design a more costly mode of dispute resolution.
For instance, the parties may wish to present their case orally for
more than a few minutes. They may wish to seek assurance that
the adjudicators will carefully read and dedicate as much time as
will be necessary to the study of their written submissions. They
may wish to have the adjudicators hear witnesses. If arbitration
gives the parties the possibility to enjoy a process which will be
different on so many accounts, it not only gives them flexibility.
It gives them an entirely different commercial justice: more seri-
ous, more accurate, more satisfying.
Let's take an example. Here is a French major company. It
has a commercial dispute with a foreign company. If the case is
litigated in France, it will go before a French commercial
court.50 French commercial courts are staffed by members of
the business community, who serve part-time asjudges.5 1 There
is no requirement that they have legal training.5 2 Hearings
before French commercial courts typically last less than an
hour.53 Witnesses are virtually never heard by the court.54 In
any case, a French rule of evidence makes evidence originating
from any of the parties inadmissible, which means that no em-
ployee of any of the two companies may validly testify. 55 If this
company goes to arbitration, it will be able to appoint a prestigi-
ous jurist as an arbitrator, as most likely will its opponent. The
hearing will last for several days. Witnesses will be heard, in par-
ticular employees who negotiated the contract for each com-
pany. The parties will expect the arbitrators to study carefully all
50. See generally John Bell, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 89-
92 (James Crawford & John S. Bell et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
51. Id. at 90.
52. Id. at 89-92.
53. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Michele Taruffo, Rolf Stumurner & Antonio Gidi,
Principles And Rules Of Transnational Civil Procedure: Introduction To The Principles And
Rules Of Transnational Civil Procedure, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 769, 774 (2001); Haz-
ard, Jr., supra note 46, at 1673-74.
54. Daniel Soulez Larivi~re, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45 AM.
J. Comp. L. 737, 743 (1997).
55. See, e.g., Bekkrar v. SNCF, Cour de Cassation [Cass. le Civ.] [high court of
ordinary jurisdiction] Paris, Apr. 2, 1996, RECUEIL DALLOZ 1996 somm. 329, 329.
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the written submissions and the evidence submitted. It will cost
more to the parties, but the French company will clearly see
what it is getting for its money. The arbitral process will not be
marginally different, the arbitral process will be essentially differ-
ent.
56
Arbitration may enable the parties who can afford it to
avoid the poor process that available courts offer, and to benefit
from a betterjustice. Critics may argue that this creates one type
of justice for the poor, and another type of justice for the rich.
Further, it could be argued that offering an alternative to those
who can afford it diminishes their incentives to work at improv-
ing the civil procedure of their country of origin. These criti-
cisms may be fair. However, prohibiting arbitration is not an op-
tion, as a neutral forum is needed to decide international dis-
putes. For some commercial parties, resorting to arbitration also
means obtaining better justice. Good for them.
3. Disadvantages
Arbitration does not only have advantages. It also has disad-
vantages. Some of them are undisputed, and acknowledged
even by arbitration's advocates. For instance, it is admitted by all
that arbitral tribunals lack some of the remedies which are avail-
able in litigation, such as the contempt power, and that the con-
tractual foundation of arbitration is an obstacle to the efficiency
of the arbitral process." Yet, nobody has ever argued that these
particular disadvantages outweigh the advantages of arbitration.
The critics of arbitration have a different point of view.
56. The flexibility of the arbitral process may offer other opportunities to shape an
essentially different process. In jurisdictions where the judicial process is costly, the
parties may wish to give up some of the procedural guarantees that it offers to make it
cheaper. For instance, American parties may wish to waive some of the guarantees af-
forded by American civil procedure in order to decrease the cost of the adjudicatory
process. See, e.g., J. STEWART MCCLENDON & ROSABEL E. EvEWRARD GOODMAN EDS., INTER-
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN NEW YORK 3-4 (World Arbitration Institute
1986). A survey conducted among participants to international arbitrations under the
aegis of the American Arbitration Association shows that often-cited reasons for using
arbitration were to save money and to limit discovery. By contrast, the fact that the
dispute was international was not cited often. See Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E.
Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys
and Business People, 30 INT'L Bus. LAWYER 203, 206 (May 2002).
57. See, e.g., REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 29-30; GAILLAR & SAVAGE, Supra note
5, at 697. Note that this last disadvantage would disappear in a non-contractual model
of arbitration such as the one that I propose. See infra Part IV.E.
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They strongly criticize arbitration, on many accounts. They ar-
gue that arbitrators lack democratic legitimacy, that their deci-
sions are not subject to appellate review, that the decline of adju-
dication entails important social costs.58 These critiques are se-
vere. Logically, they lead their authors to conclude that the
disadvantages of arbitration are so high that they outweigh the
advantages.59 It is thus necessary and important to address these
issues. I will not do it now, however, but in Parts II and III of the
Article. This is because these critiques would not merely cancel
the advantages of arbitration that I have articulated. In the
model that I propose, the problems that these critics identify
would not only remain, but actually get more acute. 60  There-
fore, they are likely to become more specifically critiques of the
proposed model.
B. The French Experience
I now present briefly the French experience, as I believe
that it shows that the French senior judiciary not only strongly
promotes arbitration, but also is increasingly tempted to bypass
the consequences of the contractual foundation of arbitration.
For several decades, the French Supreme Court for private
and criminal matters (the Cour de cassation)61 has strongly fa-
vored international arbitration and, to a lesser extent, domestic
arbitration. The manifestations of this pro-arbitration policy
have been numerous. The Cour de cassation favors the autonomy
of the arbitral process. It has ruled consistently that arbitral
awards do not belong to the legal order of the place where they
were made, and thus that their nullification by the courts of such
place will not prevent French courts from enforcing them.6 2 It
58. See, e.g., Brower et al., supra note 1, at 418.
59. Id.
60. For instance, the issue of the lack of legitimacy of arbitrators, which is already
an issue for those critics in the traditional model of consensual arbitration, would be-
come dramatic in a model where the parties would not even agree to go to arbitration.
See infra Part I.
61. The French court system is divided. Since the nineteenth century, France has
had an autonomous administrative court system topped by a specific and independent
supreme court, the Conseil d'Etat. The Cour de cassation has jurisdiction over all private
and criminal matters. Finally, the Constitutional Council has exclusive jurisdiction over
constitutional matters.
62. Socite Hilmarton v. SociWt OTV, Cour de Cass. [le Ch. Civ.], March 23,
1994, REvUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 327, 328 (1994), CharlesJarrosson, 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 663,
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has also ruled that French courts are ready to assist any party
seeking to compel arbitration even when the connection be-
tween the arbitration and France is remote. The doctrine is
that arbitration is delocalized and that no legal order may claim
any definite hold on it. The Cour de cassation also defends the
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, not only when such jurisdiction
is clear to everyone, but also when it is challenged on the ground
either that there is no arbitration agreement between the par-
ties, or that such agreement is invalid.64 The Cour de cassation
then gives arbitrators exclusive jurisdiction to rule on such chal-
lenges, and will only recover its jurisdiction to rule on them if
the resulting award is subsequently challenged.6"
For the purpose of this Article, the most interesting manifes-
tation of the pro-arbitration policy of French courts has been
their willingness to bypass the contractual nature of arbitration
when it is revealed as unfavorable to the efficacy of the arbitral
process. Originally, the voluntary foundation of arbitration was
critical to the development of this alternative mode of dispute
resolution, as it was perceived as the sole means to legitimize
private adjudication.6 6 Parties could not possibly be deprived of
their right to bring their case to public courts, unless they so
chose.6 7 However, as arbitration developed, it became apparent
that its contractual foundation could also be used strategically by
parties wishing to delay or even to avoid the resolution of their
dispute. The contractual nature of arbitration began to appear
as a problem. It offered multiple arguments to challenge the
jurisdiction of the tribunal by challenging the existence and the
validity of the arbitral agreement, and thus the power to adjudi-
cate of the tribunal. The oldest argument was certainly the chal-
lenge of this power on the ground that the tribunal had set aside
663-64 (1995); see also Philippe Pinsolle, The Status of Vacated Awards in France: the Cour de
Cassation Decision, in Pytrabali, 24 ARB. INTL 277 (2008).
63. Israel v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 30 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 125, 125-28 (2005) (Fr.) (rul-
ing that French courts had jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator instead of the defen-
dant because of the agreement of the parties on the president of the ICC as an ap-
pointing authority for the president of the tribunal).
64. NCCP, art. 1458 (1981) (Fr.); see alsoJohnJ. Barcel6 1II, Who Decides the Arbitra-
tors'Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1115, 1124-26 (2003).
65. Id. The only exception to the rule is when the lack ofjurisdiction of the tribu-
nal is "manifest," i.e., when it cannot be seriously argued that it exists.
66. See, e.g., REDFER ET At.., supra note 6, at 6, 26.
67. See, e.g., id.
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the contract containing the arbitral clause, and that, as a conse-
quence, it had retroactively suppressed its own adjudicatory
power, which flowed from the arbitration clause of the con-
tract."8 The doctrine of separability was crafted to reject this ar-
gument. Now widely accepted,69 the doctrine provides that the
arbitration clause is a peculiar clause of the contract, which as
such can be separated from it, and thus may survive it if it is
cancelled or otherwise terminated.7" The jurisdiction of arbitra-
tors thus remains even if they rule that the (rest of the) contract
has been retroactively set aside.7"
The doctrine of separability, however, could not protect ar-
bitral agreements from direct challenges to their validity.7 2 If
the applicable law made the arbitration agreement void, how-
ever separated from the rest of the contract, the agreement
would have to be set aside. Defendants willing to at least delay
the proceedings can thus, and often do, challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the arbitral tribunal by challenging the validity of the
clause, either on arbitration specific grounds, or on general con-
tractual grounds directed at the arbitration agreement.7" In
1993, the Cour de cassation decided to tackle the issue and took a
radical step. In Dalico,74 it held that international arbitration
agreements were not to be governed by any law anymore, and
that they would thus be considered as valid in principle. French
courts would only have to find an actual agreement to arbitrate.
The rule is much more liberal than the U.S. rule which prohibits
state laws from setting aside or declaring unenforceable arbitra-
tion agreements on grounds peculiar to arbitration agree-
ments.7" The French rule also prevents the operation of general
contractual rules. After Dalico, the validity of arbitration agree-
ments may not be challenged on any ground. Many French
68. Barcel6, supra note 64, at 1116.
69. See, e.g., REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 195; Barcel6, supra note 64, at 1116.
70. REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 193.
71. Id. at 194-95.
72. See generally Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration Under Private International Law: The Doc-
trines Of Separability And Competence De La Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 599, 628
(1994).
73. See, e.g., the application of the general contractual doctrine of unconsciousness
to arbitration agreements in U.S. law.
74. See, e.g., Municipalit6 de Khoms El Mergeb v. Soci~t6 Dalico, Cass. le civ. (Fr.),
Dec. 20, 1993, Bull. Civ. I, No. 1675, REv. APB. 116, 117 (1994) (Fr.).
75. See generally Drahozal, supra note 4.
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commentators were, and are still, very critical of the rule. They
have underlined that ruling arbitration agreements are not gov-
erned by any law does not make any sense.7 6 Indeed, the truth
of the matter is that whatever a French court says is representa-
tive of French law, and that the actual rule laid down by the Cour
de cassation is that French law always governs, and that it is ex-
tremely liberal. In any case, the Cour de cassation has recently
confirmed Dalico,7 7 and showed that it was not willing to change
its doctrine. The policy reasons behind the Dalico decision were
given by a senior member of the French judiciary, who was later
to become the president of the chamber of the court which rules
on all arbitration cases. In a conference, 78 he explained that de-
bates regarding the existence and the validity of the arbitration
agreement were risky and should be avoided. The goal of the
French judiciary is thus clear. The pro-arbitration policy had
met an obstacle that had to be bypassed. No way around it could
be found without hurting the contractual foundation of the insti-
tution. The doctrine of contract was bent.
It is not possible to know whether there are other, deeper
policy reasons behind the Dalico line of cases. French judg-
ments, especially from the Cour de cassation, barely give reasons,
and never give policy ones. I submit that a deeper policy reason
may have been the perception that arbitration has become the
natural mode of international commercial dispute resolution,
and that, as a consequence, arguments against the jurisdiction of
arbitral tribunals appear as increasingly illegitimate. If French
judges still perceived courts as the natural fora for such disputes,
they would perhaps insist more on finding an actual agreement
to derogate to their jurisdiction. But it may well be that, con-
sciously or not, the French senior judiciary does not perceive
courts as the natural fora for international disputes anymore.
Arbitration is still formally a derogatory mode of dispute resolu-
tion, but it may not be perceived as such anymore. In this con-
76. See, e.g., Htl~ne Gaudemet-Tallon, ComitM de la municipalitM de Khoms El Mergeb v.
Dalico Contractors, Rav. ARa. 116, 116 (1994) (Fr.) [hereinafter Note on Dalico]; Banque
Worms v. Bellot, Cass. le civ. (Fr.), Jan. 5, 1999, REV. ARa. 85 (2000) (Fr.).
77. Uni-Kod v. Ouralkali, 30 YB. COM. ARB. 1200, 1201 (2005); Christophe Serag-
lini, Uni-Kod v. Ouralkali, 2005 Rav. ARB. 959 (2005) (Fr.).
78. Jean-Pierre Ancel, L'actualitd de l'autonomie de la clause, compromissoire, in
TRAVAUX DU COMITI FRANCAS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PR-wt 75, 81 (1991-92).
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text, there is no compelling reason to fight hard to maintain the
contractual foundation of international arbitration.
The contractual nature of arbitration raises another, more
critical, issue. Only parties who have actually agreed to go to
arbitration may be compelled to arbitrate.7 9 The next step, the
most radical one, would be to move away from this rule as well.
Dalico did not.8 ° The only requirement that it maintained for
the enforcement of arbitration agreements was to find an actual
agreement to arbitrate as between the parties. Yet, recent judg-
ments of the Cour de cassation have been increasingly liberal in
their assessment of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.8'
Arbitration agreements have been found to bind parties who
had not concluded them originally with surprising ease. In
2001, the court held that when a resale of goods occurs, parties
to the first sale may rely on the arbitration clause contained in
their contract in order to resist court proceedings initiated
against them by a party to the second sale, which did not contain
any arbitration clause.8 2 The court held that the party to the
second sale could only avoid arbitration "upon evidence of rea-
sonable ignorance of the existence of the [international arbitra-
tion] clause. '83 In other words, the court accepted to consider
that a party was bound by an arbitration agreement, which the
party could have possibly known, but not necessarily. Whether
or not that party would have actually consented to such clause
did not even seem to matter for the court. In 2002, the court
held that an arbitration clause was binding on the assignee of a
contract irrespective of the validity of the assignment of the sub-
79. BUHRING-UHLE, supra note 20 at 33 ; REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 175.
80. See generally Note on Dalico, supra note 76.
81. It should also be underlined that the peculiar conception of French courts of
the competence-competence doctrine gives exclusive jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals to
rule on their jurisdiction in the absence of any arbitration agreement. In most other
jurisdictions, courts may retain jurisdiction if they can be satisfied that there is no agree-
ment to arbitrate as between the parties. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938,943 (1995). In France, courts may not, except if the lack ofjurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal is "manifest." See, e.g., Israel v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 30 Y.B. COM.
ARB. 125, 125-28 (2005) (Fr.). The French law of arbitration thus recognizes the juris-
diction of arbitrators in the absence of an arbitration agreement, but for the sole pur-
pose of ruling on jurisdiction.
82. Peavey Co. v. Claeys Luck, REv. ARB. 765 (2001) (Fr.).
83. Id. ("sauf preuve de lignorance raisonnable de l'existence de cette clause
[d'arbitrage international].").
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stantive rights.8 4 The court justified the solution by putting for-
ward the separability doctrine, ruling that the issue of the assign-
ment of the arbitration clause could be addressed separately
from the issue of the assignment of substantive rights."5 Finally,
in 2005, the court confirmed the decision of a court of appeal
which had insisted that arbitration clauses are commonly found
in international contracts of carriage by sea in order to reject an
argument based upon a lack of consent to the arbitration
clause.86 After goods carried from Asia to Africa had been deliv-
ered damaged, the insurer of the consignee of the bill of lading
had sued the carrier before the French court.8 7 As the bill of
lading contained an arbitration clause, the carrier challenged
the jurisdiction of the French court.88 The insurer argued that it
had not expressly accepted the clause.8 9 The court nevertheless
declined jurisdiction. 9° It held that the consignee could be in-
formed of the existence of the arbitration at the time of the de-
livery, and that arbitration clauses were common in such con-
tracts anyway. 9a The court did not even seek to assess whether
the insurer or the consignee had actually consented to the
clause.92 It seemed satisfied with the mere possibility that it
would have been informed of its existence at a late stage of the
contractual process, and most interestingly, with the mere fact
that arbitration is the usual mode of maritime dispute resolu-
tion.
I do not argue that these recent liberal assessments of the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate are evidence of the will-
ingness of the Cour de cassation to abandon the contractual foun-
dation of arbitration. My claim is much more limited. I submit
that the faith of the French seniorjudiciary in the importance of
84. CIMAT v. SCA, REv. ARB. 397 (2003) (Fr.).
85. Id.
86. Axa Corp. Solutions v. Nemesis Shipping Corp., REv. ARB. 437 (2006) (Fr.).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. It should be noted, however, that the case was dealing with the issue of the
jurisdiction of French courts, and that the principle of competence-competence did not
require the court to actually assess whether the dispute ought to be resolved by way of
arbitration, but only whether the contrary was not unlikely. See supra note 10 and ac-
companying text.
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the contractual foundation of arbitration has been fading. In-
creasingly, French senior judges are ready to ignore it in order
to pursue other policies, and in particular to promote interna-
tional arbitration as an efficient mode of dispute resolution.
The truth of the matter is that they are not shocked by the idea
of an arbitration without consent.
What does the French experience tell us? I do not claim
that French solutions are better for the sole reason that they pro-
mote arbitration and are more liberal. My claim is, again, more
limited. The recent developments in the French law of interna-
tional arbitration beg the question that is the topic of this Arti-
cle: should arbitration lose its contractual foundation? The
French experience shows that the question is not only academic.
The repeated attacks of French courts on such a central, unchal-
lenged, doctrine reveal that it has tremendous practical signifi-
cance.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF ADJUDICATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
Any theory seeking to extend the scope of arbitration be-
yond those disputes that the parties have actually agreed to re-
solve by way of arbitration raises the issue of the legitimacy of
such mode of dispute resolution. Indeed, the essential reason
why arbitration is perceived as a legitimate alternative to judicial
litigation is that the parties have agreed to resort to arbitration.
On the contrary, and maybe because arbitration has so much
been presented as a creature of contract, if they have not agreed
to resort to arbitration, it seems hard to imagine how this mode
of adjudication could be legitimate at all. The first objection
which comes to mind against arbitration as a default mode for
the resolution of international commercial disputes is the lack of
legitimacy of private arbitral tribunals. Intuitively, it seems that
the legitimacy of national courts is so strong that any case for
resort to a mode of resolution of disputes regarded as "alterna-
tive" in the absence of an actual agreement of the parties to that
effect is bound to fail.
Below, I argue that the legitimacy of arbitral tribunals to de-
cide international disputes, far from being weaker than the legit-
imacy of courts, is actually stronger. I review the various theories
which have been offered to found judicial power, and assess
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whether they hold in an international context. I find that some
do not, and that those that do either equally apply to courts and
arbitral tribunals, or favor arbitration.
A. Democratic Legitimacy
The weakness of the legitimacy of arbitrators seems to flow
first and foremost from their lack of democratic legitimacy. Ar-
bitrators are private individuals exercising a power which is nor-
mally entrusted to state officials acting with publicly accepted au-
thority.94 Intuitively, this seems wrong. Democratic theory com-
mands that power be only exercised with the consent of the
governed.9" It is thus critical that the holders of any power,
whetherjudicial or not, be appointed either directly or indirectly
by the community of people where this power will be exercised.
For instance, the power of American judges is legitimate because
they were either elected (in most states) or at least appointed by
elected officials (at the federal level). Of course, arguably, the
consent of the subjects of any power could be given to be exer-
cised in a much more limited and circumscribed way. In effect,
this is what an arbitration agreement amounts to. It thus legiti-
mizes the power of arbitrators to settle the dispute, at least as far
as the parties are concerned. The purpose of this Article, how-
ever, is to assess whether arbitration should become a default
mode of dispute resolution and be available in the absence of
any agreement of the parties in this respect. Non-consensual ar-
bitration would therefore raise an issue from a political theory
perspective, as it would confer to some individuals a power over
other individuals without the consent of the latter.
Is it true, however, that the alternative is much more satis-
factory? Would the legitimacy of judges be significantly higher?
Democratic theory may well demand that the subjects of any
given power consent to those who will exercise such power, but
do modern polities really meet this requirement? It is fair to
criticize private adjudication in this respect only if the alternative
would indeed be a judge enjoying democratic legitimacy. How-
ever, it appears that the democratic legitimacy of judges is not
94. See, e.g., Brower et al., supra note 1, at 418.
95. The Declaration of Independence 1 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Randy E. Barnett,
Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUMB. L. REv. 111, 112 (2003) (citing U.S. Const.
pmbl.).
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always strong, and that it becomes especially weak in an interna-
tional context.
As a preliminary point, it is important to stress that the dem-
ocratic legitimacy of judges is not an important issue in all de-
mocracies. Indeed, it might be that it is not a real issue in the
majority of modern democracies. In civil lawjurisdictions, which
represent the majority of the legal systems in the world, judges
are normally not elected, and they are not appointed by elected
officials either.96 They are typically recruited as career judges by
way of examination just as any other civil servant.97 In France,
for instance, this is the path followed by mostjudges without any
involvement of elected officials. 8 As a consequence, their legiti-
macy is not primarily democratic, but rather flows from their le-
gal expertise.99 It is often argued that they do not lack com-
pletely democratic legitimacy, as the existence of courts is typi-
cally provided by the constitution of the relevant jurisdiction,
which was adopted by the people. The constitutional founda-
tion of the existence of courts is thus also a democratic founda-
tion.'0 0 As the will of the people was often expressed by past
generations, and as it was directed at the institution abstractly
and not at particular individuals, this democratic legitimacy is
certainly much weaker than direct or indirect involvement in the
designation of the adjudicator.
The democratic legitimacy of judges is thus above all a real-
ity of the common law world, where judges are typically ap-
pointed by elected officials,' 0 ' and more specifically of the
96. See, e.g.,JoHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION 35 (2d ed. 1985).
97. Id.
98. Id. There are exceptions, however. Commercial judges, for instance, are not
civil servants, do not belong to the career judiciary and are elected by the business
community. Judges of the Constitutional Council are appointed by elected officials
[President, heads of the National Assembly, and of the Senate].
99. See infra Part II.B.
100. See Guy Canivet (Member of the Constitutional Council, formerly President
of the French supreme court for civil and criminal matters), in Loic CADIET (DIR.),
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA JUSTICE, V LtGITIMITt DU JUGE, 815, 816 (2004). For the same
argument made in the Australian context, see Murray Gleeson AC, Chief Justice of
Australia, Speech Before the Australian Bar Association Conference in New York: Judi-
cial Legitimacy 2 (July 2, 2000), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj-
aba-conf.htm; see also E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM,
PRACTICAL REASONING, AND PRINCIPLES 83 (Cambridge University Press 2005).
101. See, e.g., GLEESON, supra note 100, at 2 ("The will of the people, expressed
through Parliament, is the foundation of judicial power.").
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United States, which is the sole jurisdiction where judges are
commonly elected. In the biggest part of the western world,
judges enjoy little democratic legitimacy, and it would be unfair
to criticize arbitrators on that account. °2
In an international context, which is the focus of this Arti-
cle, there are more fundamental and general reasons why arbi-
trators do not enjoy less democratic legitimacy than judges. The
first one is that democratic legitimacy can only be conferred by a
given polity, and thus by a given community. In most cases, how-
ever, international private disputes involve parties who do not
belong to the same community. They are, for instance, nationals
of different states. It follows that, typically, each party will par-
ticipate in a different democratic process, in the country to
which the party belongs. They may each participate in the dem-
ocratic process of electing an adjudicator, or electing an official
who will subsequently appoint an adjudicator, but this adjudica-
tor will not be the same. It is therefore impossible to find an
adjudicator who is democratically legitimate in respect of both
parties. The party who does not belong to the community of the
adjudicator has expressed no will in the designation of the adju-
dicator, either directly (by electing it), or indirectly (by ratifying
the local constitution).103 The call for the democratic legitimacy
of international adjudicators raises a second and more funda-
mental issue. Democratic theory is only one normative political
theory. It is shared, at least in theory, by most states. But there
are also states where the normative political theory is different.
For instance, in religious states, legitimacy and power are
founded in religion." 4 For parties originating from such states,
the call for democratic legitimacy of adjudication is meaningless,
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., von Merhen, supra note 12, at 34. Von Merhen holds that
If they adhere strictly to their theoretical premise, relational theories face diffi-
culties that are avoided by instrumental and strict power theories. Where one
party has a social, political, or economic relationship to the forum but the
other party has none, can it be said that the forum has adjudicatory authority
over both? Strictly conceived, adjudicatory authority resting on a relationship
reaches only to the party or parties that stand in the relevant relationship to
the adjudicator.
See id.
104. See, e.g., SAUDI ARABIA: BAsIc LAW OF GOVERNMENT [Constitution], art. 7
(1992 Fundamental Law) ("Government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy
Koran and the Prophet's tradition [i.e., the Islamic Shari'a] .... "), available at http://
www.mideastinfo.com/documents/SaudiArabiaBasicLaw.htm.
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just as the call for the religious legitimacy of adjudication would
be ignored in western democracies.
Democratic legitimacy is a concept which is linked to a
given community. As the vast majority of communities are na-
tional, it is unlikely to contribute usefully to a debate on the le-
gitimacy of power in a transnational context.
B. Technocratic Legitimacy
If the legitimacy of private international adjudication does
not lie in democratic principles, it has to be found elsewhere. A
traditional claim in political theory is that the foundation ofjudi-
cial legitimacy can be found in the ability of judges to decide
disputes in accordance with the law. Again, the claim has tradi-
tionally been made without distinguishing between domestic
and international adjudication. It has thus not been presented
as an alternative to democratic legitimacy, but rather as a com-
plement." 5
In this paradigm, adjudication is perceived essentially as a
process aiming at reaching an outcome, i.e., settling the dispute.
One way to give great legitimacy to such process is to ensure that
it always reaches the right outcome. It is hard to see how a tech-
nique the function of which is to reach a certain outcome could
not be legitimate if it always reaches this outcome. To take a
culinary parallel, the legitimacy of a chef is (or should be) to
actually cook great food.
In its most radical form, the claim is thus that the legitimacy
of adjudication is founded in the accuracy of the judicial pro-
cess. This idea was particularly influential in France for two cen-
turies.' ° 6 It draws on Montesquieu's analysis of the role of the
judiciary which was so influential during the French revolu-
tion.10 7 Judges were to be machines who mechanically applied
the law. They were to be solely the mouth of the law.108 By deny-
ingjudges any discretion (and law-making power), Montesquieu
105. See, e.g., Canivet, supra note 100.
106. See Pierre Bouretz, Entre la Puissance de la Loi et la Puissance de L'Interprdtation:
L'Enignatique Ligitimite duJuge, 74 PouvoRs 71 (1995).
107. MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES Lois, DEUXIEME PARTIE: LIVRES XI 52 (1748)
("[L]a bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi; des etres inanims qui n'en peuvent
mod4erer ni la force ni la rigueur."), available at http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/
montesquieu/deesprit desjlois/partie_2/de-esprit des lois_2.html.
108. Id.
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and French revolutionaries had imagined a world where right
answers existed and where adjudication would unmistakably
reach them. However, the world imagined by Montesquieu was
only a dream (or a nightmare). The law cannot be applied
mechanically by judges. And courts often have the possibility to
decide the dispute either way. The argument thus had to be re-
framed.
One way to reframe it was to argue that, although judges are
not machines and there are often several possible solutions to a
given dispute, judges can be constrained. They do not decide
cases arbitrarily, but follow at least a methodology which con-
strains them. In the common law world, this methodology is that
of legal reasoning and of the common law.' °9 The same point
can be made with some modification in respect to the civil law
world. In both systems, legal methodology is supposed to limit
the solutions that judges can give to cases. The argument is fos-
tered by two additional requirements. The first and most impor-
tant one is the status of the adjudicator. One of the most com-
mon grounds for the legitimacy of adjudication is the indepen-
dence of adjudicators."' Once appointed, judges should have
the guarantee that they cannot be dismissed or forced to accept
a new position both geographically and within their court. They
should also have the guarantee that their salary cannot be re-
duced either. Independence is a critical condition of this para-
digm of judicial legitimacy because it should allow judges to ig-
nore outside pressure, and to indeed decide cases on a mere
legal basis. The second additional requirement is that only pro-
fessionals mastering legal methodology be appointed to the
bench. A separate but closely connected ground for the legiti-
macy of adjudicators is indeed their legal expertise. Many legal
systems insist that the people they make judges have demon-
strated outstanding legal abilities, or at least know the law very
well."' In the United Kingdom and throughout most of the
commonwealth, judges are appointed from a pool of the best
lawyers of the country." 2 Traditionally, these top lawyers have
109. See GLEESON, supra note 100, at 2-3; THOMAS, supra note 100, at 86.
110. See, e.g., GLEESON, supra note 100, at 3; THOMAS, supra note 100, at 78;
Canivet, supra note 100, at 819.
111. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 96, at 34-35.
112. See Judicial Appointments Commission, http://www.judicialappointments.
gov.uk/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) ("The independentJudicial Appointments Commis-
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been the very best barristers." 3 In most civil law countries,
judges must go through special examinations which primarily
test the legal knowledge of the candidates.1" 4 In some civil law
countries such as France, they must also attend a specialized
judges' school where they deepen their legal expertise.'" 5
The claim that the legitimacy of adjudication can be found
in the accuracy of the judicial process has also been made by
sociologists. 1 6 Their perspective, however, is different. Theju-
dicial process is presented as the way to secure acceptance of
adjudicatory authority by the litigants. Max Weber argued that
modern societies accept political power because of the belief of
the people in the legality of the actions of the ruler and the im-
partiality of the officials acting in accordance with the law. 1 7 In
his opinion, people expected that the legal order will give them
both substantive and procedural rights."' In his paradigm, offi-
cials act impartially, but are tightly constrained by substantive
law.' 19 Indeed, interestingly enough, Weber argued that judges
should act as "automatons. ' 120 In other words, much as in Mon-
tesquieu's model, 12' litigants expect that the law will provide a
single and right answer, and that officials will decide disputes in
accordance with these rules.122 It is these beliefs that secure
their acceptance of judicial power.
It is widely accepted that the legitimacy ofjudicial power lies
to a large extent in the ability of judges to decide the dispute in
accordance with the law. Undoubtedly, some litigants have a
clear idea of what the law says and expect a particular rule to be
applied. Such parties may well accept the decision of an adjudi-
sion (JAC) selects candidates for judicial office. It does so on merit, through fair and
open competition, from the widest range of eligible candidates.").
113. Barristers have traditionally been regarded as the best lawyers within the Brit-
ish legal system. The best barristers are formally recognized as such by being made
Queen's Counsel ("Q.C."), typically after ten years of practice.
114. See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 96, at 35.
115. See Bell, supra note 50, at 61.
116. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY (1970).
117. Id. at 199.
118. See generally MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein
ed. (1954)).
119. Id.
120. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 116, at 219.
121. For a parallel between the two theorists, see Pierre Bouretz, supra note 106, at
75.
122. WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 116, at 199.
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cator upon the condition that the adjudicator properly applies
the law and enforces their rights.
What is the comparative legitimacy of judges and arbitrators
to apply the law accurately? It seems clear that a court staffed
with judges trained in the applicable law will be highly legitimate
to apply this law.' 21 This is not to say, however, that arbitral
tribunals will necessarily be less legitimate. One of the advan-
tages of arbitration is its flexibility. The parties may appoint ar-
bitrators with different qualities depending on their concerns. If
they would rather have a tribunal composed of arbitrators highly
skilled in the applicable law, they may appoint prestigious jurists
from the relevant legal order who will be at least as knowledgea-
ble as judges. Indeed, many judges begin a career as interna-
tional arbitrators upon retirement. 124 More fundamentally, in
many legal systems, the prestige of law professors makes them at
least as suitable arbitrators as judges for this purpose. 125
Although the technocratic theory of judicial legitimacy
seems widely accepted as a normative theory, its descriptive value
has long been challenged.' 26 The most famous criticism came
from American realists, who argued that judges do not decide
cases on the basis of legal rules, but instead respond to the stim-
ulus of the facts of the case. 1 2 7 It is certainly true that some
judges use their independence and the finality of theirjudgment
to free themselves from the law or even legal methodology. This
regularly happens in many jurisdictions, though probably more
often in the United States than elsewhere. Overall, however, it is
123. See, e.g., Brower et al., supra note 1, at 418 (arguing that the legitimacy of
international commercial adjudication flows from "a hierarchy of decisional instances;
... decisions made by judges acting with publicly accepted authority; resulting finality
of decisions; and a relatively consistent body of jurisprudence."). The last argument
expressly refers to the right answer paradigm, but so does the first, as hierarchy aims at
correcting lower adjudicators' decisions, and ensuring that the system will eventually
rule right. For a related argument, criticizing arbitration for the lack of oversight of
arbitral awards, see Silberman, supra note 41, at 11. The main argument of Dammann
and Hansmann on the superiority of courts over arbitral tribunals is that courts will
apply the law more accurately. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 22, at 33.
124. See Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 167,
177, 203 (2001).
125. This is especially true in the civil law tradition. See MERRMAN, supra note 96,
at 56 ("[T]he civil law is the law of the professors.").
126. See Brian Leiter, American Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 52 (Martin P. Goldin & William A. Edmundson eds.,
2005).
127. Id.
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likely that most judges do feel constrained by the law and will
more often than not apply it.
Yet, this does not mean that the ability ofjudges to apply the
law and, in most cases, their willingness to do so, necessarily en-
hances their legitimacy in the eyes of the parties. The techno-
cratic theory certainly overlooks that, in many instances, parties
do not have strong expectations as far as the law and their rights
are concerned. First, litigants may be more or less aware of their
rights. Depending on their knowledge of the law, they could
have very different expectations about the judicial process. Sec-
ond, the law could be more or less clear. It could be old and
known by everybody, or still to be settled. Third, the applicable
law could be more or less clear. The parties could have the pos-
sibility to bring a claim before a variety of adjudicators, which
could all have different choice of law rules leading to the appli-
cation of different substantive laws. As long as no action is initi-
ated before a given court, how can any of the parties expect a
single outcome to the dispute? The expectations of the parties
may thus vary greatly. Some may have a clear idea of what the
law is and says and expect a particular rule to be applied. Such
parties may well accept the decision of an adjudicator upon the
condition that he properly applies the law and enforces their
rights. But other parties will be unable to say what the law is.
They will thus not expect the application of a given rule. In an
international context, the chances are that the doubts as to the
applicable law will increase dramatically, as the parties will typi-
cally have even more possibilities to bring their claims before
different adjudicators applying different choice of law rules.
The situation will only be different when the parties have pro-
vided for the applicable law, and when the likelihood of another
court refusing to enforce such clause is low.' 28 Furthermore, it
should be underlined that parties also decide to submit interna-
tional disputes to vague sets of rules such as the lex mercatoria or
the equity of the adjudicator. In such instances, the certainty as
to the applicable law and the legal rights of the parties is also
obviously very low.
Two kinds of international disputes can thus be distin-
128. It must be recalled that, by definition, the contract will not contain any juris-
diction clause, and that the parties will thus have the possibility to bring proceedings
before a variety of adjudicators.
2009]
448 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:417
guished. The first kind of disputes will be clearly governed by a
given law containing detailed rules. Typically, the dispute will be
contractual, and the parties will have agreed upon the applicable
law. In this context; the parties may have strong expectations as
to their legal rights. The legitimacy of the adjudicator may thus
lie in his ability to apply the law accurately. 29 Still, it is impor-
tant to stress that, if the law remains an abstract phenomenon
for the parties, or if they are not legally sophisticated and pro-
vided more or less mechanically for the applicable law, they may
not particularly value right legal reasoning. The second kind of
disputes will not be clearly governed by any set of detailed rules.
This will be the case when the applicable law has not been pro-
vided for by the parties, or when they have agreed upon the ap-
plication of the lex mercatoria or some other vague set of rules. In
such cases, it is hard to see why the parties would care much for
the ability of the adjudicator to apply the governing law accu-
rately.
C. Procedural Legitimacy
No democratically appointed adjudicator is available to set-
tle the vast majority of international disputes. In most cases,
there is no certainty as to which law will be applied, and experi-
ence shows that, even when there is such certainty, courts may
easily find arguments to decide each way. How can the power of
international adjudicators be legitimized, then? Scholars have
argued that their legitimacy could be grounded in the fairness of
the process.
Weber had argued that people accept judicial power be-
cause of their belief that officials are constrained by rules of
law.1 ° By contrast, more recent scholarship has argued that the
legitimacy of adjudication is grounded in the acceptance of the
validity of the judicial process alone. In his book, LEGITrIMACY
THROUGH PROCEDURE, 1 3 1 German sociologist Niklas Luhmann
129. But it is important to keep in mind that this law would not necessarily be the
law of the adjudicator, i.e., the lex fori. If the applicable law is foreign, it is hard to
legitimize the power to adjudicate of the court on the legal training of its members in
their own law. The legitimacy of the adjudicatory process would then depend on the
reliability of the process of establishing the content of foreign law.
130. See generally WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 116.
131. NKLuAs LUHMANN, LA LPGITIMATION PAR LA PROCtDURE (Lukas K. Sosoe &
Stfphane Bouchard trans., Presses de l'Universit6 Laval 2001) (1969).
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submitted that the people may realize that disputes can be de-
cided either way on the merits, but will only accept fair adjudica-
tion, which he equated to impartiality and procedural equal-
ity. 1 2 Similarly, social psychologist Tom R. Tyler has long ar-
gued that procedural justice is a critical factor in the evaluation
of the legitimacy of adjudication."' When substantive solutions
are not obvious, as for instance in complex societies which lack a
common moral code from which to draw standards of right or
wrong, legal authority will be evaluated from a purely procedural
point of view.'3 4 One could indeed think that, when an unbi-
ased adjudicator who has allowed the parties to present their
case fully makes a decision, the parties should at least consider
that the resolution of their dispute was not illegitimate and thus
accept the decision. Each party should be allowed to present
their arguments fully and to discuss and have the opportunity to
rebut the arguments of the other. The adjudicator should be
unbiased and decide the case on his appreciation of the strength
of the cases of the parties. The independence of adjudicators
becomes the critical ground for the legitimacy of adjudication,
together with the fairness of the procedure. I would also add
that giving an explanation of the reasoning used, as explaining
one's decision seems to be one of the most essential ways to fos-
ter acceptance of the decision by the parties. It can show to the
losing party that his case was carefully and fairly considered, and
that the decision was made on non-arbitrary grounds by an unbi-
ased adjudicator." 5
Are national courts and arbitral tribunals as well equipped
to offer a fair process? As was already discussed, i3 6 they are not.
The greatest advantage of international arbitration is precisely
that it offers a fairer process, especially by offering impartial ad-
judication, but also, often, by putting the parties on a more
132. Id. at 129.
133. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
134. See Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power in Civil Dispute Processing, in JUSTICE AND
POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 309, 330 (Bryant G. Garth and Austin Sarat eds., 1998).
135. Surprisingly, Luhmann neglected explaining the decision, which, in his opin-
ion, was meant to show that the right answer had been reached by the adjudicator. It is
certainly also important in the technocratic paradigm, as it ensures that a proper legal
methodology has been followed. See, e.g., GLEESON, supra note 100, at 7 (referring to it
as the "hallmark of legitimacy").
136. See supra Part IA
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equal footing. 137 This is the reason why international arbitration
has been so successful. In this paradigm of judicial legitimacy,
arbitrators are actually much more legitimate than judges when
it comes to settling international disputes.
D. Participative Legitimacy
There is a final important difference between arbitrators
and judges. While the parties may not choose who their judge
will be, they are most often involved in the designation of the
members of the arbitral tribunal.1 3 Although the parties are
free under most arbitration regimes to decide how to appoint
the members of the tribunal, the most common practice is for
each party to appoint its own arbitrator, and then for the two
party-appointed arbitrators to appoint the president of the tribu-
nal. 39 It follows that each party has had its say in the composi-
tion of the tribunal. Furthermore, it is also a very common prac-
tice for the party-appointed arbitrators to seek the unofficial ap-
proval of the parties when they appoint the president.140 In such
a case, each party has participated actively in the designation of
the majority of the actual members of the tribunal. Irrespective
of the absence of agreement of the parties on the jurisdiction of
the adjudicator, their active participation in the choice of the
people who decide their dispute necessarily greatly enhances the
legitimacy of the adjudicator. 4 '
Arbitrators are conferred additional legitimacy as the par-
ties participate in their appointment. This is a form of legiti-
macy by consent, comparable to democratic legitimacy. For our
purposes, however, it has many advantages over democratic legit-
137. It should also be underlined that, contrary to some domestic practices, inter-
national arbitral awards typically give reasons, and typically long ones. From the per-
spective of legal orders where courts usually give scarce reasons (which is the case of
most of the civil law world, with some extremes like France where the supreme courts
barely give reasons), this is an additional procedural advantage of arbitration.
138. There would be no reason to suppress this rule as a consequence of arbitra-
tion losing its contractual foundation.
139. It is also sometimes expressly the default rule. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976).
140. HANOTIAU, supra note 1, at 201-03.
141. See Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFFA "s Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 55 (2003); Paulsson, supra note 31, at 14 (stating that "it
seems inevitable that the international arbitral process will be perceived less readily as
legitimate when a party is disappointed by an award rendered by three unknown arbi-
trators.").
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imacy. First, it is not linked to any particular community, more
specifically to any national community. Second, it does not look
like a normative theory, which might not be shared by one of the
parties, but rather like pure common sense. 14 2 It thus translates
well in a transnational context.
The question which this Section seeks to answer is whether,
as a matter of theory, it is conceivable to resort to arbitration in
the absence of an agreement of the parties to that effect. The
answer is yes. Although it might be counter-intuitive, in most
instances, arbitral tribunals do not enjoy less legitimacy to try
international disputes than national courts. Democratic legiti-
macy is not a viable theory to found judicial power in an interna-
tional context. Courts may have greater legitimacy to apply the
law accurately, but this is far from being always true, and most
often it will not change anything from the perspective of the par-
ties. Actually, the only real differences between courts and arbi-
tral tribunals are the greater fairness of the arbitral process and
the involvement of the parties in the designation of the mem-
bers of arbitral tribunals. These two last factors favor heavily ar-
bitral tribunals, which not only do not lack legitimacy to settle
international disputes, but are in fact far more legitimate than
national courts.
III. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In Part II, I have argued that the model is conceivable as a
matter of theory. I now ask whether it would be beneficial. The
main claim of this Article is that default arbitration would result
in increased procedural fairness in the resolution of interna-
tional commercial disputes. This would be an important benefit.
Obviously, I cannot assess the desirability of the model without
investigating whether it would entail further benefits and, more
importantly, costs.
Scholars have long debated the desirability of alternative
dispute resolution.'4 3 They have always underlined the same
tension. On the one hand, private dispute resolution costs
142. It also enables the parties to put into practice whatever normative theory they
believe in by appointing arbitrators fitting into the said theory. For instance, parties
from religious communities can consent to the appointment of arbitrators with the
relevant religious background or training.
143. See, e.g., DRAHOZAL & NAMuARa, supra note 3, at 19-23; Silberman, supra note
41, at 9-14.
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less. 144 In particular, it saves public resources. On the other
hand, private dispute resolution undermines the public func-
tions of adjudication. The legal systems which have chosen to
promote alternative dispute resolution seem to consider that the
benefits outweigh the costs. But scholars have mostly concluded
that saving public resources could not justify undermining the
public functions of adjudication. 145
In Section A, I seek to assess whether my model would in-
deed harm the legal system by preventing courts from serving
their public functions. I examine evidence from the practice of
several specialized fields of international commercial arbitration
and conclude that the public functions of adjudication would be
equally well served in my model. In Section B, I conduct an eco-
nomic analysis and conclude that my model is likely to be effi-
cient.
A. Courts as Public Goods
A significant part of the American legal academy is hostile
to alternative modes of dispute resolution in general' 46 and to
arbitration in particular.'47 For these scholars, the rise of alter-
native dispute resolution raises a variety of issues. Some are not
directly relevant for the purpose of this Article. For instance, a
central concern is the development of alternative dispute resolu-
tion ("ADR") in disputes between parties who are not equals.'48
Striking examples are employment and consumer arbitrations,
where the imbalance between the parties is obvious. The issue
then arises whether arbitrators have less ability to remedy the
imbalance than courts. 1 49 Though not necessarily nonexistent,
the concern is far less important in a commercial context where
144. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
145. See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, Feeling Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI
L. REv. 494, 545 (1986) [herinafter Resnik, Failing Faith].
146. See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); Resnik, Fail-
ing Faith, supra note 145, at 545; see also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the
Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995).
147. See Geraldine Szott Moorh, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 432 (1999);Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is Itjust?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1631 (2005); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory
Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA.J. LAB. &
EMp. L. 685, 703 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 146, at 1076; Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 146, at
513.
149. Sternlight, supra note 147, at 1648-50.
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typically there will not be significant imbalance between the par-
ties.1
50
Some other concerns of these scholars, however, are more
general. The most serious one is that the function of courts is
not only to resolve private disputes.151 Courts do also serve pub-
lic functions. The most important of them is certainly lawmak-
ing. Courts interpret statutes, and, in their absence, lay down
rules. 15 2 Courts also educate the public on the content of the
law and the functioning of the legal system.15 3 Finally, courts
take into consideration the public interest when they resolve dis-
putes implicating it. 154 In addition to the settlement of private
disputes, courts also serve a "public good." The concern is that
ADR might not serve this public good. In other words, ADR may
serve better the private good of settling disputes, but it fails, it is
argued,1 55 to serve the public functions of litigation. More to the
point, since arbitration has developed in the fields of consumer
and employment law, many scholars have argued that arbitration
would underperform such public functions, and that extending
its scope would erode judicial precedent and public knowledge
of the law156 and would also lead to underenforcement of public
laws. 157
1. Law Making
The proposed model would obviously lead to a decrease in
the number of decisions made by courts in international com-
mercial disputes. Courts would only continue to handle cases
where the parties would have agreed to their jurisdiction. A re-
sult may be that courts ultimately handle very few cases. Would
courts, then, be unable to continue to lay down rules? This is
150. See, e.g., William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: the Ex-
panding Scope of International Arbitration, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 624, 648 (1986).
151. Id. at 629, 635; see also Luban, supra note 146, at 2622.
152. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as Private Good, 8J. LE-
GAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979).
153. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 146, at 1085; Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 146, at
554.
154. See, e.g., Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 150, at 672.
155. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 146, at 1089; Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing
Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211,
249 (1995); Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 252.
156. Moorh, supra note 147, at 426; Summers, supra note 147, at 704.
157. Park, supra note 150, at 629.
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not certain. They would handle fewer cases, but not necessarily
so few that they would lose the possibility of continuing to de-
velop the law. Indeed, it is unclear whether they handle many
now. If the claim that arbitration is already widely used to settle
international commercial disputes 58 is true, it may be that the
model would not change much in this respect. Moreover, there
might be reasons to limit the scope of the model even within
commercial law. 159 I do indeed propose to exclude small claims
from the model. 160 Such claims would still be settled by courts.
Courts would thus continue to try a number of commercial dis-
putes. Ultimately, perhaps the only substantive consequence of
the model would be that courts would develop international
commercial law more slowly. 6' That would certainly be worse
than developing it more quickly, but arguably not much
worse.162
Let's assume, however, for the sake of the argument, that
the model would entail such a dramatic decrease in the number
of cases handled by courts that they would not be able to serve
their public functions. Whether arbitral tribunals could not pos-
sibly take over and serve these functions is far from clear. I ar-
gue that the arguments put forward by the critics of ADR and
arbitration only show that certain types of ADR may raise issues,
but not that all ADR would necessarily. 163 In other words, it is
158. See supra Introduction.
159. I discuss the scope of my model infra Part IV.A.
160. See infra Part W.A.
161. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse, 23
ARB. INT'L 357, 362-65 (2007). Kaufmann-Kohler's piece shows through a survey of
several hundreds of awards, that the vast majority of arbitral awards settling interna-
tional commercial disputes (as opposed to sport and foreign investment disputes) do
not cite prior arbitral awards. Kaufmann-Kohler argues that the existence of developed
national laws makes it unnecessary for arbitrators to rely on arbitral awards to deter-
mine the content of the applicable law, which is typically national. The issue of the
ability of arbitrators to take over this task only arises if national laws do not have the
possibility to develop anymore.
162. It could also be that the problem is more academic than practical if most
international commercial disputes are fact- and contract-driven. In a world dominated
by freedom of contract, disputes would mostly be resolved by contractual interpretation
and fact finding, and law would not really matter. The claim is made by one of the
leading and most experienced international commercial arbitrators, Swiss Professor
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler. Id. at 375-76.
163. See Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECON., VOL. V.
THE ECONOMICS OF CrIME AND LITIGATION 159, 173 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Guest eds., 2000).
THE CASE FOR DEFA ULT ARBITRATION
perfectly possible to imagine a type of arbitration devoid of the
problematic features of current U.S. ADR and domestic arbitra-
tion.
a. Traditional Arguments
ADR critics make five assumptions when they claim that ar-
bitrators cannot develop precedents. To begin with, they iden-
tify two features of the arbitral process which prevent the public
from knowing what arbitral tribunals do and which rules they
apply.'64 The first is that arbitration is confidential. 165 The sec-
ond is that arbitrators do not give reasons, or do not give suffi-
cient reasons, for their decisions. 166 One can then understand
why, even if they were interested in developing precedents, arbi-
trators could not do so, since their decisions and reasoning
would remain out of reach. Yet, there is no reason to believe
that these two features are necessary. As far as confidentiality is
concerned, it is true that it is one of the advantages of the arbi-
tral process which is most often put forward by its supporters. It
is not, however, a necessary feature of arbitration. There are in-
stances of non-confidential arbitration, as will be shown
shortly,167 and I propose such a model. As far as the lack of rea-
sons for arbitral awards is concerned, it is true that some arbitra-
tion laws allow awards that do not state reasons.16 However, this
is far from being the norm. Under most international arbitra-
tion regimes, arbitrators are under a duty to give reasons.169 Fur-
thermore, the practice of international arbitrators is to give de-
veloped and detailed reasons. 170 International arbitral awards
are not short. They are often much longer than many national
164. See Moorh, supra note 147, at 431, 437.
165. See id. at 431; Summers, supra note 147, at 703.
166. See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 245; Summers, supra note 147, at 703.
167. See infra Part III.A.1.b.
168. This is obviously the case in American law, but also, for instance, in Swedish
international commercial arbitration law. See L. HEYMAN, ARBITRATION LAW OF SWEDEN:
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE 497 (Juris Pub. 2003).
169. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act 1996, c.23, § 52 (Eng.) [hereinafter English
Arbitration Act]; ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] [German Code of Civil Procedure] Jan.
30, 1877, 1052; Switizerland's Federal Code of Private International Law [CPIL], Dec.
18, 1987, art. 189; International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules [ICC], 1998,
art. 25; JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION 666-73 (2d ed. 2007).
170. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, Law and Practice of International Com-
mercial Arbitration 392 (3d ed. 1999).
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judgments (in particular those rendered by civil law courts),' 7 '
and it is not unusual to see awards going beyond one hundred
pages. Some even provide dissenting opinions.
1 72
ADR critics further argue that, even if access to arbitral
awards was easy, it would not bring much, as arbitrators have
neither the willingness, nor the ability to develop precedents.1
73
First, arbitrators would have no incentives to develop rules, as
they would not be paid to perform this function, but solely to
resolve disputes. 1 74 Second, they would not have the appropri-
ate training anyway. 175 Finally, and in any case, even if they
would and could, arbitration is too decentralized to offer the
possibility to develop a consistent and precise body of rules.'
76
The first two arguments are contradicted by the reality of
modern international commercial arbitration. 177 It is true that
the vast majority of international arbitration regimes do not re-
quire that arbitrators have legal training. 71 It is also true that
the service that the parties seek is the settlement of their private
dispute. However, in practice, most international arbitrators are
distinguished jurists. They are either experienced legal practi-
tioners, or law professors.' 79 Their legal expertise and prestige is
often very high. If one accepts that judges are not superheroes
for the sole reason that they went through the appointing pro-
cess of their country of origin, there is no reason to consider that
arbitrators could not have the training and the skills to develop
the law if they wanted to. However, would they be willing to do
so? Again, the practice of international commercial arbitration
is that they most often are, so much so that they are commonly
urged not to forget that their main task is not to develop the law
and to write legal dissertations, but to settle the disputes appro-
171. Judgments from civil law courts are traditionally much shorter than judg-
ments from common law courts. See generally B.S. Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism
and Courage: A Common Lauyer Looks at some Judgements of the German Federal Court, 34 AM.
J. COMP. L. 349 (1986).
172. See Alan Redfern, Dissenting Opinion in International Commercial Arbitration, 20
ARB. INT'L 223 (2004).
173. See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, aL 238.
174. See id.
175. See Moorh, supra note 147, at 435.
176. See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 239; Moorh, supra note 147, at 437.
177. See Moorh, supra note 147, at 437.
178. Actually, I know of none that do.
179. See, e.g., Paulsson, supra note 31, at 14; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 170, at
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priately 8 ° At first glance, this may seem surprising. Arbitrators
do not seem to need to engage in a difficult activity without be-
ing paid for it, and parties certainly do not have any reason to
pay for an activity which will essentially benefit others, i.e., future
litigants. 1 ' How can this seemingly inefficient conduct be ex-
plained, then? Quite simply, by the need for arbitrators to show
their skills. They do not necessarily wish to market themselves
aggressively so as to be appointed in future arbitrations,'82 but
they certainly have a professional reputation that they wish to
maintain, or to enhance. Additionally, it should be underlined
that many international arbitrators, especially in the civil law
world, are law professors. 83 Thus, they have an inclination to-
ward legal analysis, and may use arbitration as just another fo-
rum.
The last argument against arbitral tribunals' capacity to de-
velop precedent is the most serious. Arbitration is a decentral-
ized process. Tribunals rule without being subject to review.18 4
Hence, there is no possibility for a higher court to harmonize
the law. Moreover, there is no other rule or mechanism that
forces tribunals to follow the decisions made by other tribunals
in prior cases, such as the common law doctrine of stare decisis.
As a result, there is a risk, which seems high at first sight, that
tribunals would take different positions on similar issues. The
system as a whole would be unable to develop the law harmoni-
ously, as it would produce contradictory statements of what the
law is. The assumption behind this argument is that the only
incentives for judges to follow prior cases is the legal obligation
to do so (in the common law world), or the risk of being over-
ruled by a higher court (in the civil law world).
Yet, there may well be other incentives. First, irrespective of
whether they are obliged to follow them, judges may seek actual
guidance in prior cases to determine the best solution. Many
180. See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 170, at 392; Lord Bingham, Reasons
and Reasons for Reasons: Differences Between a Court Judgment and an Arbitration Award, 4
ARB. INT'L 141, 154 (1988).
181. Luban, supra note 146, at 2622.
182. See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 238. Despite their hypothesis, Landes
and Posner did not seem convinced that it could actually occur. It remains clear that
"whatever their motivation, arbitrators tend to want to be reappointed." Paulsson, supra
note 31, at 14.
183. Franck, supra note 24, at 1597-98.
184. Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 248.
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judges only want to apply the law and do not want to determine
what the best rule is each time they decide a dispute. More im-
portantly, once a given conduct has become a common practice
in a group, few members of the group want to stand out. Men
wear suits and ties without any legal obligation to do so. Of
course, this is not to say that one cannot decide to ignore the
practice, but this takes a good deal of courage. The easy path is
to follow the practice.
The same certainly applies to adjudicators. Once several de-
cision makers have adopted a given solution, it is difficult for the
next adjudicator not to follow. Of course, a free-minded adjudi-
cator could explain why he does not agree with the prior deci-
sions. However, would that really be enough not to be criti-
cized? Would other members really understand? They may, but
if they do not, he puts his reputation at risk.
Finally, irrespective of an actual obligation to follow prior
decisions, adjudicators may be convinced that legal certainty and
predictability are good for the parties, consequently adopting so-
lutions that are consistent with prior decisions to achieve this
result. 85 Additional incentives to follow prior decisions do exist.
Would they suffice in the absence of a superior court? Recent
developments in some specialized fields of international arbitra-
tion suggest that they do.
b. Evidence from the Practice of International Arbitration
In the last decade, the practice of international arbitration
has offered evidence that arbitral tribunals can develop prece-
dents. In several specialized fields, arbitral tribunals cite, ex-
amine, and follow decisions made by prior tribunals. 86 Some of
the common features of these specialized arbitrations explain
why this has been possible. First, most of the awards made by
these tribunals are public. They are typically available online
shortly after being made and also published in legal journals.
Second, the awards provide a detailed analysis of legal issues.
Particularly in foreign investment law, such analyses commonly
reach a hundred pages. Third, the vast majority of the arbitra-
tors sitting in the tribunals consists of experienced legal academ-
185. See Gabrielle Kauffman-Kohler, supra note 161, at 374.
186. See generally id. Much of this Section draws heavily from this work.
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ics or practitioners and, sometimes, very distinguished jurists."8 7
On these three accounts, the arbitral tribunals are not signifi-
cantly less equipped than courts to make the law and develop
precedents. Of course, if these tribunals had been unwilling and
unable to develop precedents, they would not have done so. Yet
they have.
In the last decade, foreign investment law has offered evi-
dence that arbitral tribunals can develop precedents.1 8 8 Foreign
investment law is a branch of international law which concen-
trates on the protection of foreign investment. It enables for-
eign investors to sue the state which hosted the investment for
compensation but failed to offer due protection for the investor.
Indeed, states have concluded an impressive number of Bilateral
Investment Treaties ("BITs")' 89 affording not only substantive
protection to the investors of the contracting party but also an
arbitral forum 19 0 to bring claims of breaches of such protection;
consequently, foreign investors have been able to initiate arbitral
proceedings against host states irrespective of any arbitration
agreement. Arbitral tribunals, particularly those constituted
under the aegis of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Dispute Resolution ("ICSID"), have thus settled several hun-
dreds of investment disputes.1"' They did so by applying the pro-
tection offered by the applicable BIT." 2
Formally, each BIT is different from the next. They are dif-
ferent instruments. In substance, however, BITs do not vary
greatly. They are similar, but are not identical. For instance,
they all afford fair and equitable treatment to foreign investors,
187. See Franck, supra note 24, at 1597-98 (noting this is especially so in foreign
investment arbitration).
188. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 161, at 365 (noting international sport law
has offered similar, if not more conclusive evidence of this).
189. In 2008, more than 4000 such Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs") had
been concluded. There are also a few multilateral investment treaties such as the En-
ergy Charter Treaty.
190. BITs typically offer a choice to foreign investors, who can choose to sue the
host states in a variety of fora. For instance, the courts of the host states are often
mentioned. Yet, in practice, almost all investors choose to initiate arbitral proceedings,
as the neutrality of the courts of the state is not ensured. See Franck, supra note 24, at
1523.
191. See id. at 1539 nn.65-69.
192. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 161, at 369. Some tribunals have noted that
their decisions were dependent on the terms of the bilateral investment treaty ("BIT")
involved.
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but not exactly on the same terms. A given expropriation may
be a breach under one treaty, but not under the other. As a
result, foreign investment law had great potential for offering
evidence that a decentralized system of private adjudication
could not develop a consistent body of law. Indeed, these tribu-
nals do not even apply the same legal regimes, and there is no
superior adjudicator to solve any conflict that may arise if such
tribunals reach different conclusions as to the meaning of a par-
ticular provision.193
However, what has happened is exactly the contrary. Arbi-
tral tribunals deciding foreign investment disputes have devel-
oped over the course of a few decades, a consistent body of law,
and their awards have, in effect, acquired precedential value.'94
This remarkable evolution has now become one of the most de-
bated subjects in expert circles195 and is even backed by an em-
pirical study.196
The practice of foreign investment arbitral tribunals evolved
193. When the arbitration takes place under the aegis of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), annulment of the arbitral award
may be sought before an ad hoc committee. See Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S 160 (No. 8359) (1966). Such a committee, however, is not
more permanent than first instance arbitral tribunals and has no power to solve any
conflict of interpretation.
194. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 161 (suggesting that absent a doctrine
of precedent per se, there exists a great reliance on the earlier cases or a stare decisis
doctrine in certain specific fields, such as sports arbitration and investment arbitration);
Franck, supra note 24, at 1616 (stating that although arbitration awards do not have
precedential value, attorneys and investors rely on the published decisions to imple-
ment legitimate policy choices).
195. See, e.g., Alejandro A. Escobar, The Use of ICSID Precedents by ICSID and ICSID
Tribunals, speech delivered at the British Institute of International and Comparative
Law ("BIICL") Annual Meeting panel (une 19 2005); Christoph Schreuer, Diversity and
Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration, paper delivered at "Inter-
pretation Under the Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties-25 Years On," (Feb.
7, 2006); Matthew Weiniger, Is Past Performance a Guide to Future Performance-Precedent in
Treaty Arbitration, paper delivered at the BIICL's "Seventh Investment Treaty Forum
Public Conference: Procedural Aspects of Investment Treaty Arbitration" (Sept. 8,
2006); Andrea Bjorklund, Investment Arbitration Decisions as De Facto Precedent, paper de-
livered at the ASIL International Economic Law Group's Annual Conference (Nov. 10,
2006).
196. See Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation
Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence, 24J. IrN'L ARB. 129 (2007); Jeffery P. Commission,
Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Empirical Backing, in TRANSNATIONAL Dis-
PUTE MANAGEMENT 6 (2007).
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as follows.' 9 7 In the early years, when foreign investment arbitra-
tion was slowly beginning, tribunals relied on decisions of other
adjudicators, such as the decisions of international tribunals (for
instance the International Court of Justice) or the awards made
in international commercial cases."' 8 It was only at a later stage
that it became possible for foreign investment arbitral tribunals
to think of examining the awards of other foreign investment
arbitral tribunals. This came in the 1990s, when the practice of
citing prior awards of such tribunals began. 9  Only a few awards
were cited on average by each tribunal through 2002. Then, the
citation rate increased exponentially, a trend which has contin-
ued to develop over the last few years. Today, awards cite on
average more than ten prior awards.200
Prior awards are cited in order to determine how similar
issues have been addressed by past tribunals. These issues are
most often related to the interpretation of provisions that are
commonly found in BITs. For instance, the guarantee of a fair
and equitable treatment of foreign investors, found in virtually
all BITs, has been consistently interpreted by tribunals, as not
requiring bad faith or malicious intent of the host state.2 1' Not
only are prior awards cited in support of this interpretation, but
a tribunal has stated that "there is a common thread in the re-
cent awards" to adopt this solution.20 2 Less frequently, tribunals
have addressed issues which were not provided for in the BITs,
such as the regulation of parallel litigation in investment dis-
putes. 2 " Awards have ruled consistently that tribunals ought to
apply for this purpose the civil law institution of lis pendens, and
decline jurisdiction only when a competing adjudicator is al-
197. The evolution of the practice of international sport tribunals has followed
similar lines. See Kauffman-Kohler, supra note 161, at 362.
198. See Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a
Developing Jurisprudence, supra note 196, at 153.
199. See generally Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Empirical
Backing, supra note 196.
200. See id. at 7.
201. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Rep., Case No. ARB/01/12, Award (July
14, 2006); Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08, Award (Feb. 6,
2007).
202. See Azurix, Case No. ARB/01/12, Award.
203. See Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. [Vivendi] v. Argentine Rep.,
Award, Nov. 21, 2000, 16 ICSID REv. 641 (2001); 40 I.L.M. 426 (2001); 125 I.L.R. 1
(2004) and Annulment Decision Uuly 3, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002); 6 ICSID REP. 340
(2004); 125 I.L.R. 58 (2004).
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ready seized of the same dispute from the perspective of the par-
ties involved, the cause of action, and the remedy sought.2°4
Thus, foreign investment arbitral tribunals have been able
to adopt solutions which have been consistently followed and
have become a rule. This is additional evidence that arbitral
tribunals can create rules, and that awards can be, in effect,
precedents. It must be recognized, however, that the case law of
foreign investment arbitration tribunals is not as consistent on
all issues. There are instances where similar BITs' provisions
have been interpreted differently not only by the tribunals which
first addressed the issue, but also by subsequent tribunals. This
happened most famously with the Most Favored Nation
Clause, 20 5 and with the so-called Umbrella Clause. 20 6 Today, the
interpretation of these two provisions is not settled.2 7 This di-
vergence could be taken as evidence of the inability of decentral-
ized systems of adjudication in general, and of foreign invest-
ment arbitral tribunals in particular, to develop a consistent
body of law.208 A more moderate view, however, could be that
"rule creation cannot be linear and that the road is necessarily
bumpy, with dead-ends and U-turns,"20' 9 and that consistency will
204. See Compafifa de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. [Vivendi] v. Argentine Rep.,
Award, Nov. 21, 2000, 16 ICSID REv. 641 (2001); 40 I.L.M. 426 (2001); 125 I.L.R. 1
(2004) and Annulment Decision (July 3, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1135 (2002); 6 ICSID REP. 340
(2004); 125 I.L.R. 58 (2004); Genin et al. v. The Rep. of Estonia (June 25, 2001), 17
ICSID REv. 395 (2002); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Rep. of Argentina, Decision of the
Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (July 17, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 800 (2003); Azurix
Corp. v. Argentine Rep., Decision on Jurisdiction, December 8, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 262
(2004); Enron Corp. v. Argentine Rep., Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 2, 2004) ;
Lucchetti S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Rep. of Peru, Award (Feb. 7, 2005), 19 ICSID
REv. 359 (2004); see generally Gilles Cuniberti, Parallel Litigation and Foreign Invest-
ment Disputes Settlement, 21 ICSID REv. 381 (2006).
205. The Most Favored Nation Clause provides that each contracting party shall
accord to investors of the other party treatment no less favorable than treatment that it
accords to investors of third parties. Conflicting awards were made as to the scope of
the provision. See generally YANNICK RADI, The Application of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause
to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the 'Trojan
Horse,' 18 EUR. J. INT. LAw 757 (2007).
206. The Umbrella Clause typically provides that each contracting party shall ob-
serve any obligation it may have entered into with regard to the specific investment.
The issue arose as to whether the clause could be interpreted as turning breach of
particular investment contracts into violations of the treaty. See generally Thomas Wdlde,
The Umbrella Clause in Investment Arbitration-A Comment on Original Intentions and Recent
Cases, 6J. WORLD INvESrMENT & TRADE 183 (2005).
207. See generally supra notes 205-06; Franck, supra note 24, at 1569.
208. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 24, at 1557.
209. Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 161, at 377.
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be achieved over time. It should not be forgotten that arbitral
tribunals have only been deciding investment disputes on a regu-
lar basis for a few decades. In such a short time, they have estab-
lished many rules. They have not created a complete and consis-
tent body of law, but has any court been able to achieve such a
result in such a short period of time? How many legal systems
can claim that they never allowed inconsistent solutions to de-
velop and to remain for some time? The truth of the matter is
that modern foreign investment law not only confirms that arbi-
trators can develop precedents, but also suggests that it is their
natural inclination.
2. Law's Exposure
Another public function of adjudication is to make the law
accessible to the public. 211 Public access to adjudication enables
the public to learn about the law and about procedures. Public
trials and published judgements teach the public that there are
rules, and that such rules are enforced. 211 This knowledge in-
creases the awareness of the public of their rights, and thus re-
sults more often in the vindication of those rights. The actual
reach of the legal syszem is extended. Moreover, as the state is
able to clearly show that it uses its power in accordance with pro-
cedures and rules, it reinforces the legitimacy of such power.
Critics of ADR argue that as adjudication declines, so does
public knowledge of the law and "the occasions to observe the
exercise of state authority. ' 2 1 2 As already noted, it is clear that
my proposed model would further contribute to a decrease in
the number of cases adjudicated by public courts. Would this
jeopardize public access to the law? There are several reasons to
believe that it would not.
First, the public functions served by law's exposure might
only require that a few cases be accessible publicly. Recall that
my proposed model would not dry up litigation. Parties could
still choose to litigate before a national court, and courts would
retain jurisdiction over small claims. Some litigation would re-
210. See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 BOSTON U. L. Rev.
1101, 1111-14 (2006).
211. See Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 405, 405-
26 (1987).
212. Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, supra note 210, at 1102.
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main, and it may be that such litigation is sufficient to ensure
exposure of the law.
Second, as critics admit,213 law's exposure is not only
achieved through public access to trials, but also through public
access to decisions and reports. While alternatives to adjudica-
tion in the United States have traditionally been out of reach of
the public both because attendance to public processes was diffi-
cult and because decisions were not published, the practice of
foreign investment tribunals has shown that arbitral awards
could be made accessible to the public.2 1 4 Certainly, the availa-
bility of such awards has ensured the education of many on the
operation of foreign investment law. It has also shown that the
guarantees afforded by BITs are enforceable and given a great
deal of legitimacy by the international legal order. Again, for-
eign investment arbitration is evidence that arbitration can serve
some of the public functions that courts have traditionally
served. Two issues remain, however. One is that arbitration, a
private activity, would obviously not appear as an exercise of
state authority. Thus, an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy
of this authority would be lost. Would this be a problem? Are
states in such desperate need of legitimacy? Certainly, the rest of
litigation would remain,215 and so would other manifestations of
judicial authority such as judicial buildings.216 Another issue is
whether the absence of public access to hearings would be a sig-
nificant loss. Arbitral hearings have traditionally been inaccessi-
ble to the public, even in specialized fields of international arbi-
tration.21 7 In 2006, the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") amended its rules of arbitra-
213. See id. at 1113.
214. See supra notes 186-94.
215. In most legal orders, arbitration is confined to commercial matters. Excep-
tions exist, however, the most remarkable being the United States, where arbitration
has been accepted in consumer and employment disputes. In such legal orders, the
proposed model would then be part of a wider phenomenon of privatization of adjudi-
cation. For a discussion of the United States, see Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudica-
tion?, supra note 210, at 1123. If the phenomenon became too important, it could raise
additional issues that the privatization of commercial justice only would not raise.
216. On court buildings and the reinforcement of judicial legitimacy, see Judith
Resnik and Dennis E. Curtis, Representing Justice: From Renaissance Iconography to Twenty-
First-Century Courthouses, 151 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 139
(2007); Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, supra note 210, at 1103.
217. See, e.g., Court of Arbitration for Sport, Special Provisions Applicable to the
Ordinary Arbitration Procedure, Procedural Rule 43.
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tion to recognize the power of foreign investment arbitral tribu-
nals acting under the aegis of ICSID to allow third parties to
attend the hearings .2 " But, for the time being, third parties are
rarely admitted to arbitral hearings. However, a fair question is
whether public hearings contribute as much to law's exposure as
the publication of decisions. My sense is that they do not, and
that what really matters is the availability of decisions. I will thus
propose a model where the parties and the tribunal decide
whether to make hearings accessible to the public and the
press .2 9 But making arbitration hearings open to the public
and the press a mandatory rule is certainly also conceivable.
3. Public Interest
Finally, the extension of the scope of international arbitra-
tion might be a cause for concern for a more general reason.
Courts serve a variety of functions, both private and public. I
have argued that private adjudicators may be able to serve these
functions. It could be argued, however, that they may not be
able to serve them as well. More specifically, one may wonder
whether private adjudicators would be sensitive to the public in-
terest. Would they take it into account when deciding disputes?
Would they take it into account when participating to the devel-
opment of precedents?
The issue would not be a new one. Arbitration scholars
have long debated about the desirability of private adjudication
in fields where disputes typically involve more than the private
interests of the parties. 22" Antitrust claims, for instance, not only
protect private competitors, but also the public at large. Should
they be arbitrated, then? Or does the protection of the public
interest require that such claims be handled by courts? Two ap-
proaches have been used to address the issue. First, some claims
were found to implicate non-negotiable public interests and thus
to be unarbitrable. 221 The subject matter of such claims was
deemed unarbitrable, and agreements to arbitrate them would
218. ICSID Arbitration Rules, art. 32 (2006). On this evolution, see Aurelia
Antonietti, The 2006 Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations and the Additional
Facility Rules, 21 ICSID REv. 427, 431-33 (2006).
219. See infra Part IV.D.
220. See, e.g., PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DisPuTEs supra note
20, at 115; Park, National Law and Commercial Justice, supra note 11, at 674-79.
221. See Park, National Law and CommercialJustice, supra note 11, at 668-74.
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not be enforced. Second, public law claims could be found arbi-
trable, but courts would reserve a right to have a second look
when the parties seek enforcement of the award.222 An award
infringing a public law of the forum would be found as contrary
to public policy and thus denied enforcement. Today, the sec-
ond approach dominates in most sophisticated jurisdictions. For
instance, in the field of antitrust, it has been endorsed both by
the U.S. Supreme Court223 and by the European Court of Jus-
tice.2 2 4
Policymakers have thus been aware of the issue of the pro-
tection of the public interest in arbitration for a long time. In
most jurisdictions, they have continued to promote arbitration
in general and international commercial arbitration in particu-
lar. They are either satisfied that the public interest is suffi-
ciently protected under the present regime, or that, if it is not,
international arbitration attracts other benefits which outweigh
society's interest in supervising adjudication of public law
claims.2 2 5 For the purpose of this Article, it is unnecessary to
determine whether they are right. The issue of the protection of
public interest in arbitration does not depend on the foundation
of arbitration. It does not arise differently in a consensual or in a
non-consensual model of arbitration. Thus, as a full discussion
of the doctrine of arbitrability would fall outside the scope of
this Article, I will defer to the assessment made by each jurisdic-
tion with regard to the protection of the public interest in arbi-
tration.
B. Cost
An obvious consequence of the model would be to decrease
the number of cases handled by courts. Arbitral tribunals would
decide cases which are presently handled by courts. The dockets
of courts benefiting from the model would thus be reduced. Ju-
dicial resources would be spared and could be used for other
purposes. As already discussed,2 21 it seems clear that many
222. See id. at 668-69.
223. See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, supra note 20.
224. See generally Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton Int'l, Case 126/97, [1999]
E.C.R. 1-3055.
225. See generally Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 150.
226. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
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would appreciate these consequences.
However, in order to properly assess the efficiency of the
model, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the
parties would pay the costs related to the resolution of their dis-
pute, such as the arbitrators' fees and expenses. From an eco-
nomic perspective, the model is only efficient if this cost is less
than the judicial costs which would be saved as a result. Other-
wise, society as a whole may be better off continuing to bear the
costs of dispute resolution and seeing the parties' resources in-
vested differently. Unfortunately, judicial costs are very complex
to assess, and arbitrators' fees vary.2 27
There are two reasons to believe that the costs of privately
funding adjudication would be inferior to the costs of doing so
publicly. First, privatizing adjudication would internalize what is
now an externality. In the present system, parties do not pay the
costs of adjudication, which are borne by the community of tax
payers.22 "8 As parties do not incur such costs, they do not con-
sider the expenses when deciding whether to bring a claim.
They have incentives to sue for claims less than judicial costs.
The result is inefficient, as they may recover a sum or otherwise
benefit from the suit, at the expense of a greater cost for the
community. This inefficiency can be avoided by making the
parties bear the costs of adjudication. In other words, the num-
ber of suits should actually decrease, as inefficient suits would
not be brought anymore. Second, the price of the service would
not be fixed unilaterally by states, but by the market. One could
expect that competition would result in lower prices.
There is, however, yet another variable to include in the
equation. Suits are not only a cost to society. They also produce
benefits. As is also pointed out by civil procedure scholars,229
suits allow for rule production. They also inform the public at
large that the law is enforced, and thus deter potential injurers
from misbehaving. These benefits are societal. All members of
227. See Lee, supra note 43, at 268. In 1984, the Solicitor General of the United
States evaluated the average cost of operating an American courtroom to US$400-600
per hour. This would not be extremely different than what some of the major interna-
tional arbitration institutions which calculate arbitrators' fees on an hourly basis,
charge: in 2007, the London Court of International Arbitration average rate is GBP 250
per hour (this fee is per arbitrator, and does not include either the costs of the tribunal
or the fees of the arbitral institution).
228. See id.
229. See supra Part I.A.
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the community may enjoy them. Thus, there is a case for having
all members of the community pay for their production-that is,
all members of society should bear the cost of funding courts.230
There is also a case for allowing suits mainly to produce
these benefits. The efficiency of litigation should take into ac-
count the broader societal benefits as well as the private benefits
of the parties. A suit is efficient when the sum of the societal
benefits exceeds the costs of such suits, not when only the pri-
vate benefits exceed the costs of adjudication. So, an issue could
arise if the parties bear judicial costs, as the parties in pursuit of
their own interest would only consider their own benefits, but
not societal ones. Thus, one may fear that the disputing parties
would no longer sue when their private benefits are inferior to
judicial costs, irrespective of the societal benefits of the claim.
This argument has led many law and economics scholars to ar-
gue that charging users the court fees to bear the judicial costs,
will not necessarily promote efficiency.231
Although framed differently, this argument is essentially the
same as the one made by civil procedure scholars, and it can be
answered along similar lines. There are two reasons to think
that my model will not harm rules production and the legal sys-
tem's ability to deter. First, the assumption behind the argu-
ment is that private adjudication could not itself produce rules
and show that the law is enforced. I argue that this assumption is
wrong, and that private adjudication can be public, and thus de-
ter, and that it can also produce rules.23 2 Second, while it is
likely that a dramatic decrease in litigation would prevent courts
from serving their public functions, it is doubtful that even a sig-
nificant decrease would. Public functions could be served by a
small number of decisions. A few cases are necessary to produce
a rule, and a few more to send a clear signal that injurers can be
sued effectively by injured parties. In this respect, there is a criti-
cal difference between the private and public benefits of litiga-
tion. While private benefits are only enjoyed if the case is actu-
ally litigated (or settled), public benefits are enjoyed after the
litigation of a few cases only. Of course, you do need these few
230. See generally RIC-ARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
131 (1985).
231. See id. at 10; seegenerally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF THE LAw 399 (2004).
232. See supra Part III.A.
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cases. If the private benefits are routinely inferior to the judicial
costs, there is a risk of all litigation drying up. But if the private
benefits are often, if not routinely, high, then the public benefits
will be produced in any case. Thus, a critical issue is the average
value of claims. While it could be low and thus raise issues in
labor or consumer disputes, it is probably sufficiently high in
commercial disputes. Furthermore, one could decide to distin-
guish between low and high claims, and privatize the settlement
of the latter only.233
It thus seems that my model would be less costly and thus
more efficient. It would certainly decrease public spending. In
those jurisdictions facing the difficult issue of allocation of
scarce public resources, this would be an important benefit.
The cost-benefit analysis that I have conducted leads me to
conclude that the benefits of the model clearly outweigh its
costs. The model would increase the fairness of the resolution of
international commercial disputes. It would save public re-
sources. I will also argue shortly that it would improve the arbi-
tral process. 23 4 Legal scholars have traditionally argued that
these benefits would be cancelled by the societal cost of under-
mining the public functions of the courts. I find that recent de-
velopments in specialized fields of international arbitration show
that this cost is not necessary. If it is not incurred, it seems clear
that the model is largely beneficial.
IV. THE MODEL: DEFAULT ARBITRATION
In previous Parts, we learned that non-consensual arbitra-
tion could raise issues, but that such issues could be effectively
addressed by designing a model of non-consensual arbitration
incorporating certain key features. I now build on these findings
and present my model.
So far, I have only insisted on the most important feature of
the model. Parties may resort to arbitration in the absence of
any arbitration agreement. More generally, the rule would be a
default. It would apply in the absence of any agreement of the
parties on the mode of resolution of their dispute. As I only
233. See infra Part W.A.
234. See infra Part IV.E. As arbitration would lose its contractual foundation, tradi-
tional rules resulting from this contractual foundation and perceived as problematic
could be changed, and the arbitral process would thus be improved.
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want to discuss the resolution of international commercial dis-
putes, I believe that there is no reason in principle why the will
of the parties should not be taken into account, and their agree-
ment enforced. In other words, if the parties have negotiated a
dispute resolution regime, it must be applied. They are free to
make any decision in this respect. They may agree to resort to
arbitration or to bring their claim before a given national court.
Fine. This hypothetical is outside the scope of this Article.
In the absence of any agreement on jurisdiction, I propose
that any of the parties have the right to resort to arbitration.
This means that either the plaintiff or the defendant could make
the decision to arbitrate, and that the other party would have to
abide by such a decision. In case that other party would not
want to freely participate in the arbitral proceedings, the party
willing to go to arbitration could seek enforcement of its right
before a court. 235 Such enforcement could take two different
forms.
If the other party had already initiated proceedings before a
court, that court ought to decline jurisdiction and refer the par-
ties to arbitration instead. In practice, one can predict that this
would happen most often when a foreign defendant would be
sued in the plaintiff's courts. If the foreign defendant was un-
comfortable litigating before his opponent's courts, he would
apply for a referral to arbitration. He would not have to, and
could decide to abide to the initial choice of the plaintiff if he
wanted to. But even under local civil procedure, the foreign de-
fendant would be under no obligation to do so, as the right to go
to arbitration would be his under local civil procedure. This
right could be enforced in a second way. Irrespective of any pro-
ceedings on the merits brought before a court, any of the parties
could decide to initiate arbitral proceedings. If the defendant
were then to decide to ignore the arbitration, the party willing to
go to arbitration could apply to a court for an order compelling
arbitration. In practice, one can predict that it would happen
either when the plaintiff would want to go to arbitration, or
when a defendant would have made the decision to transfer a
case from a court to an arbitral tribunal, but the other party
would not cooperate.
235. See Landes & Posner, supra note 152, at 246. The unavailability of courts
would obviously make the model unworkable.
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The right of the parties to go to arbitration would be exactly
the same as the right of the parties who conclude arbitration
agreements providing for nothing else than the principle that
the dispute must be resolved by way of arbitration. In interna-
tional arbitration, such an agreement is typically valid.23 6 It only
needs to be clear as to the mode of dispute resolution that the
parties have actually agreed upon. If it is, it then triggers the
default arbitration regime of the applicable law. When the ap-
plicable law is sophisticated, it provides a complete regime that
allows the arbitration to take place. It either provides default
rules to appoint the arbitrators, 23 7 or offers the support of local
courts if the parties are not reasonable enough to use one of the
recognized ways of appointing the members of the tribunal.238
Once the tribunal has been appointed, the applicable law then
typically gives it a lot of discretion to conduct the proceedings,
and more generally to rule on any issue that may arise. If one
excepts the very few rules which are the direct consequences of
the contractual foundation of arbitration, it is only necessary to
apply the existing law. Though founded on a critical shift in par-
adigm, the arbitration would essentially look like a traditional
one.
A. The Scope of the Rule
1. Proposed Scope
The first issue that the model raises is that of its scope. In
consensual arbitration, the issue is addressed indirectly through
the determination of arbitrability. As only certain types of dis-
putes are arbitrable depending on their subject matter,23 9 the
scope of arbitration can be deduced a contrario from the rules on
arbitrability. Only arbitrable disputes can be arbitrated. This Ar-
ticle does not intend to revisit arbitrability. The model would
thus apply only to arbitrable disputes. But an additional issue
236. See, e.g., NouvEAu CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1493 (Fr.), De-
cree Law No. 81-500 of May 12, 1981,Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise U.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], May 14, 1981; Arab African Energy Corp. Ltd. v.
Olieprodukten Nederland B.V., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 419 (Q.B.) (U.K.).
237. See, e.g., 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra, note 33, art. 11; English Arbitra-
tion Act, § 16.
238. See, e.g., Swiss Law of Private International Law, art. 179 (1987); French New
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1493.
239. See Park, Private Adjudicators, supra note 150, at 629-30.
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would arise in my model. It would be necessary to determine
which parties can be compelled to arbitration. In consensual ar-
bitration, the answer is straightforward: the parties who con-
sented to arbitration. The contractual foundation of arbitration
dictates its personal scope. If the foundation of arbitration
changes, the issue must be reconsidered.
As was discussed earlier, there are several reasons why arbi-
tration appears as a more appropriate mode of dispute resolu-
tion of international commercial disputes than litigation. It of-
fers not only neutrality, but also equality and procedural flexibil-
ity. Depending on which of these advantages is put forward, the
scope of the rule could be more or less wide. As the most impor-
tant rationale of the model is to ensure neutrality of adjudica-
tion, it seems that the model ought to apply first and foremost in
cases where the parties would have different origins, and one
party could reasonably fear disadvantage because of its origin. It
follows that the model only applies to disputes involving a local
party and a foreign party. For the purpose of the rule, "foreign"
and "local" could be defined in different ways, but it seems that
what should matter most is whether the parties actually belong
to a given community. I would thus insist on their residence and
domicile rather than their nationality, although one should take
nationality into account if it could be shown that it alone would
put a party at a disadvantage before a given court. The principle
would thus be that the model would apply only to disputes in-
volving parties domiciled in different jurisdictions. Exceptions
to the principle could exist when, despite the different origins of
the parties, it would be clear that neither party can reasonably
fear partiality from a given court. A first exception could be
made when a foreign plaintiff would have chosen to sue before
the courts of the defendant. It could be considered that the de-
fendant could not possibly claim that his own courts could be
biased against him, and that seeking to transfer the case to an
arbitral tribunal would most probably be a strategic move. A sec-
ond exception could be made when none of the parties are lo-
cal, i.e., for proceedings initiated before the court of a third
state. It could be considered that no party is at a disadvantage,
and that the court ought to retain jurisdiction. Note, however,
that other considerations could dictate to accept to refer to arbi-
tration even in these two instances, for example because arbitra-
tion would also offer procedural flexibility, or because it would
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240
not be funded by local tax payers.
A general exception ought to be made on the ground of
denial ofjustice. The exception would allow parties unwilling to
go to arbitration to avoid doing so in two cases. First, if a party
could show that an arbitral tribunal would be unable to grant
him the relief sought whereas a court could, it may be envisaged
to allow this party to sue before a court. Arbitral tribunals are
generally able to grant most remedies, but traditionally they are
considered unable to grant certain ones, or at least to do so
meaningfully. For instance, they have no contempt power. If
such remedy was critical for one of the parties' cases, and if it
could not be obtained in separate court proceedings, an excep-
tion could be made. 41 Second, parties unable to meet the costs
of the arbitration, in particular arbitrators' fees, ought to be al-
lowed to go to court. In a commercial context, this would often
mean a bankrupt party. But it could also mean a party with too
small a claim for arbitration to make sense economically. If the
amount of the claim is smaller than predictable arbitrators' fees,
compelling arbitration would amount to a denial of justice.
There may be a case for not making an exception in such cases,
in order to avoid inefficient litigation, but one could also argue
that it would allow courts to continue to settle a fair amount of
disputes and to continue to serve their public functions.2 4 2
When I discussed the legitimacy of adjudication, I argued
that a variety of factors contribute to the legitimacy of arbitral
tribunals, including the fairness of the arbitral process and the
ability of the tribunal to apply the law properly. 243 Fairness has
always been a central concern in international arbitration. It is
required, and its absence would jeopardize the validity of the
award. By contrast, proper application of the law on the merits
is not a concern of the arbitral process. Errors of law are no
ground to challenge arbitral awards. This is understandable in a
context of consensual arbitration, where it can be argued that
240. See infra Part V (referring to arbitration could then become an alternative to
declining jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens).
241. This hypothesis ought to be clearly distinguished from the hypothesis of
higher chances of losing on the merits before one of the adjudicators. The issue of the
appropriate assessment of the merits of the claims could only be seriously raised in the
context of a law clearly governing the dispute, and should be dealt with by appointing
arbitrators with skills in the applicable law.
242. See supra Part III.A-B.
243. See supra Part II.
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arbitration was chosen in order to avoid courts. However, as
soon as the contractual foundation of arbitration disappears, the
issue must be reconsidered. Some may be of the opinion that, in
the absence of an agreement of the parties, the arbitral process
can only be legitimate if guarantees are given that the tribunal
would reach the right result. Two different kinds of guarantees
could be imagined. First, courts could be allowed to review the
award on the merits. However, such a rule would reintroduce
courts into the equation, where the initial purpose of the model
was to exclude them because of their potential partiality. A sec-
ond kind of guarantee could be obtained ex ante, before going
to arbitration. A party could be allowed to resist an action to
compel him to go to arbitration by showing that he has precise
expectations as far as the applicable law is concerned, and that
an arbitral tribunal would be more likely to deceive him than a
court. I argued above2 44 that the claim that the legitimacy of
international adjudication lies in the ability of the adjudicator to
reach the right result is only serious when the parties can have
precise expectations as to the applicable law. This is mostly the
case when a clause providing for the application of a given na-
tional law has been stipulated in the contract. By contrast, the
absence of such clause would often make the determination of
the applicable law very complicated, as several fora with different
choice of law rules would typically be available to the parties. It
would also be strong evidence of how little the parties cared for
the applicable law when they negotiated the contract, and argua-
bly ever since. As a result, it should not be enough for parties
unwilling to go to arbitration to show that they have precise ex-
pectation on the applicable law. They must also be able to show
that an arbitral tribunal would be more likely to deceive these
expectations than a court. The argument could only make sense
if the alternative was between a court applying its own law, which
would thus have to be available, 45 and an arbitral tribunal whose
members would not be knowledgeable in the applicable law.
2. What can be Learned from U.S. Diversity Jurisdiction?
An interesting parallel can be drawn between the model
and the diversity jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. The U.S.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. At the very least, the court would have to have jurisdiction over the dispute.
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Constitution provides for the jurisdiction of federal courts to de-
cide disputes between citizens of different states and citizens of a
state and foreign citizens.246 As in my model, diversity jurisdic-
tion focuses exclusively on the origin of the parties and allows
federal courts to retain jurisdiction irrespective of the subject
matter of the dispute. 47 What I propose as the main rationale
for the model, protecting outside parties from local bias, is also
"the traditional, and most often cited, explanation of the pur-
pose of diversity jurisdiction. '24' A direct consequence is that
defendants sued before the state court of their domicile may not
seek removal of the dispute at the federal level, as they should
not fear partiality from their own courts.24 9
The proposed model is thus comparable to diversity juris-
diction in many respects. But what makes this parallel most in-
teresting is that, although diversity jurisdiction has been part of
U.S. law for more than two centuries, 250 it has been strongly criti-
cized for half of its existence. 251 The richness of the debate over
the desirability of diversity jurisdiction thus may be a great op-
portunity to test my model and predict the issues that it will
raise.
A large part of the debate on the desirability of diversity ju-
risdiction revolves around its efficiency. The main goal of the
critics of diversity jurisdiction is to reduce the pressure on the
federal caseload.252 They seek to save public resources. Sup-
porters of diversity jurisdiction answer that abolishing diversity
jurisdiction would merely shift the burden from one judicial sys-
tem (the federal one) to another (the judicial systems of
states).251 Critics reply that it would still be more efficient, as it
246. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
247. However, one exception exists for domestic relation disputes. See generally
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CrVIL PROCEDURE 26 (3d ed. 1999).
248. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 338 (2d ed.
1982).
249. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (2006). On the rationale of the rule, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 342 (3d ed. 1999).
250. Diversity jurisdiction was given statutory authority as soon as 1789 in the first
Judiciary Act of 1789.
251. For a summary of the cases for and against diversity jurisdiction, see CHEMER-
INSKY, supra note 249, at 288-90; Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REv. 97,
101 (1990).
252. See Kramer, supra note 251, at 102.
253. SeeJohn P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 403,
412 (1979).
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would cost less for states to decide these issues than it does for
federal courts.2 5 4 The proposed model would of course be criti-
cally different from diversity jurisdiction in this respect. It would
not transfer cases from one court to another, but from public
courts to private adjudicators. It would certainly save public re-
sources, but at the expense of private actors rather than other
taxpayers. I have argued above that the model would be more
efficient as there are reasons to believe that the price paid by
private actors would be less than the public resources saved as a
result.255 In any case, public lawmakers are usually much more
concerned by the consequences of policies on public resources
rather than their overall efficiency. From this perspective, the
consequence of the model would clearly be beneficial.
An additional issue raised by diversity jurisdiction is that it
allows forum shopping. Plaintiffs can choose to sue either in a
federal or in a state forum. Although it is not uniformly criti-
cized, 56 forum shopping has traditionally been condemned as a
manipulative tactic, 25 7 including by the U.S. Supreme Court.258
Furthermore, the mechanisms crafted to avoid parallel litigation
in each forum can be abused. 259 Related litigation then devel-
ops before different adjudicators. The issue of the relationship
between these adjudicators appears, and requires specific tools
to be addressed. 26" The judicial concurrency is thus at the origin
of additional costs for both the parties and the courts, and these
costs do not seem justifiable. 261' The proposed model would also
254. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141
(1973). In addition, an issue peculiar to the U.S. context is that federal courts apply
state laws in diversity cases, sometimes before state supreme courts settle the law, while
it would make more sense if state laws were applied by state courts. See, e.g., id.; Kramer,
supra note 251, at 104.
255. See supra Part II1.B.
256. See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping. A Realistic Look at
Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999); George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum
Shopping-Why Doesn't a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649, 653
(1993).
257. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 119, 148 (2003); Kramer, supra note 251, at 107.
258. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992); Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
259. Abuse occurs primarily by initiating actions in state courts which do not satisfy
the requirements of removal to federal courts.
260. See Kramer, supra note 251, at 105.
261. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1963); Kramer, supra note 251, at 107.
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allow plaintiffs to choose between different adjudicators (na-
tional courts and an arbitral tribunal). The purpose of the
model would not be to allow parallel litigation before these adju-
dicators. If any of the parties expressed the willingness to go to
arbitration, courts ought to decline jurisdiction. Of course, it
cannot be ruled out that the model could not be abused, and
that ways to initiate parallel proceedings before courts could not
be found by clever lawyers. Tools to deal with the problem
would then have to be crafted. However, there would be a criti-
cal difference between my model and U.S. diversity jurisdiction.
The United States is a sovereign. Though a federal state, it is a
domestic legal order hierarchically organized. In this context,
aspirations to an ordered judicial world are understandable and
reasonably realistic. By contrast, the international society is not
hierarchically organized. Each state is a sovereign. Interna-
tional forum shopping exists because states define freely the ju-
risdiction of their courts. Judicial concurrency is a sad, but logi-
cal and inescapable reality of the international arena. It is prob-
ably not good, but it will not change anytime soon. The
proposed model would probably diminish this judicial concur-
rency.2 62 At the same time, it would maybe create new difficul-
ties because it could create new kinds of parallel litigation. The
model might replace what is today an unavoidable evil with a
new one. This could certainly not be counted against the model.
Finally, I turn to the reason most often put forward to justify
diversity jurisdiction, protection from local bias. Although legal
historians still debate whether it was the actual reason behind
the creation of diversity jurisdiction,263 protection from local
bias remains the traditional rationale for this head of jurisdic-
tion. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled that it is
the foundation of diversity jurisdiction. 264 The concern for local
bias also remains a key issue in the debate focusing on the desir-
ability of diversity jurisdiction.265 Critics challenge that there is
still enough bias in modem America to justify diversity jurisdic-
262. See supra note 261.
263. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 286 ("[T]here is little agreement about
why diversity jurisdiction was created."); see also Bassett, supra note 257, at 130.
264. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945); Burgess v. Selig-
man, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
61, 87 (1809).
265. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 290; Bassett, supra note 257, at 119.
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2661htee wr o etion. Supporters argue that even if it were so, fear of bias re
mains and is enough of a reason.26 7 Finally, many underline that
while the question of the existence of local bias is critical, only
an empirical study could resolve it, and that such a study is very
difficult to devise. 268 For the purposes of this Article, there is no
need to go into the details of this debate, let alone to take a
position. It will suffice to note that when critics of diversity juris-
diction propose abolishing it, they reserve the case of alienage
jurisdiction. 26 9
In 1978, a bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction, which passed
the House of Representatives (but not the Senate), also provided
for maintaining alienage jurisdiction.27 ° Two different ratio-
nales are offered to distinguish between domestic and interna-
tional diversity jurisdiction. The first is that suits involving aliens
can have effects on the foreign relations of the United States and
should therefore be decided by federal courts.27' The second is
that the need to protect foreign parties from local bias is clear
and more pressing than the need to protect out-of-state par-
272 frties. The first argument is obviously not relevant for the pur-
pose of this Article, but the second suggests that the need to
offer a neutral forum for the resolution of disputes involving for-
eigners is also felt in the United States.
Of course, it must be emphasized once again that diversity
jurisdiction is critically different from the model proposed in
this Article: what supporters of alienage jurisdiction have in
mind is the transfer of a case from one American court to an-
other, not a transfer from a court to a private adjudicator. There
is only so much that one can learn from comparing apples and
oranges. Yet, it is also fair to ask whether alienage jurisdiction
makes such a difference for foreigners fearing local bias. After
266. See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 254, at 141.
267. See, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Local Prejudice Feared?,
7 LITIG. 38, 39 (1980-81).
268. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 290; Kramer, supra note 251, at 119.
269. See Thomas D. Rowe,Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and
Potential for Further Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 963, 966 (1979); Kramer, supra note 251, at
121-23; Bassett, supra note 257, at 146 n.133.
270. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 249, at 287.
271. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 269, at 967; Kramer, supra note 251, at 121.
272. See Bassett, supra note 257, at 146 n.133 (stating that bias against foreigners is
well documented); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations
and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE
J. IN-r'L L. 1, 31 (1996).
THE CASE FOR DEFAULT ARBITRATION
all, as many critics of diversity jurisdiction have noted, federal
judges are not very different from state judges.273 They have the
same education, similar careers, and live in the same communi-
ties. Indeed, many federal judges are former state judges.274 If
the rationale for alienage jurisdiction is to protect foreigners
from local bias, then the remedy offered by the American legal
system and the U.S. Constitution is too weak. Aliens ought to be
offered an even more neutral forum.
The longstanding debate on the desirability of diversity ju-
risdiction in the United States is instructive. Many arguments
used by the supporters and the critics of diversity jurisdiction are
relevant for the purpose of testing the model that I propose in
this Article. Their analysis in the particular context of the pro-
posed model leads to a positive conclusion. The American expe-
rience offers additional support to the thesis developed in this
Article.
B. Grounds for Review of Awards
In the traditional model of international arbitration, courts
review arbitral awards on certain limited grounds. Generally,
such review can occur for two purposes. First, the validity of the
award can be challenged, typically before the courts of the seat
of the arbitration. Second, awards may be enforced only after
being reviewed by the courts of the jurisdiction where enforce-
ment is sought. In each case, awards are reviewed on similar,
limited grounds-mostly, the existence of an agreement to arbi-
trate and the fairness of the arbitral proceedings.275
By contrast, awards are rarely reviewed on the merits; courts
do not review whether arbitrators properly applied the law and
assessed the facts.27 6 Nevertheless, an exception can occur when
273. See Kramer, supra note 249, at 120; Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 27, at
1122 n.10 (noting that judges and juries at both levels "are largely similar in characteris-
tics and roles."). The argument was made, however, that diversity jurisdiction should be
maintained because of the real or perceived higher quality of the federal bench. See,
e.g., Frank, supra note 253, at 410.
274. On the U.S. system of selecting judges, see POSNER, supra 230, at 15-22.
275. The grounds for the review of awards vary from one jurisdiction to another.
Essentially, however, they almost invariably aim at verifying that the agreement of the
parties was respected, and that the arbitral process was fair. For a comparative survey of
the grounds for the review of arbitral awards, see JULIAN D. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 673 (2003).
276. See, e.g., REDFERN ET AL., supra note 6, at 530. Common lawjurisdictions, how-
2009]
480 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:417
the award infringes public policy.27 7 Public policy is typically in-
terpreted as referring not to any legislative policy, but rather, to
the most fundamental principles of the forum.278 It follows that
the public policy exception may come into play only in cases
where arbitrators applied certain laws involving public interest,
or where arbitrators reached substantive results that are not only
wrong, but shocking.
In the non-consensual model of international arbitration
that I advocate, the first issue to raise is whether awards could be
reviewed at all. The main rationale behind the proposed model
is to enhance procedural fairness by allowing the parties to avoid
courts and to litigate before a more neutral forum. At the heart
of the model is the recognition that parties can legitimately fear
local bias. There is no reason to believe, however, that judges
could show bias only in proceedings on the merits. They can
also show bias in review proceedings. They could systematically
set aside awards finding against local parties.279 The model aims
to involve courts as little as possible. Yet, it would seem neither
realistic nor reasonable to suppress the review of arbitral awards.
To begin with, it seems clear that countries will not consent to
enforce arbitral awards without verifying that they meet certain
basic conditions. Furthermore, and more importantly, the
grounds for review reflect policy decisions which must be sanc-
tioned, as will be addressed shortly.
The concern of bias in review proceedings can be addressed
by giving jurisdiction to entertain challenge proceedings to a
court perceived as neutral. This would be done by setting the
seat of the arbitration in a jurisdiction unrelated to the parties
and, arguably, to the dispute.280 This would not solve the issue
of bias in enforcement proceedings. In most cases, however, the
plaintiff who could not enforce the award in a given jurisdic-
tion-typically the defendant's country of residence-has the
option of seeking enforcement in another jurisdiction that has
ever, have often been inclined to review awards on the merits. See LEW ET AL., supra note
275, at 677.
277. See REDFERN ET AL, supra note 6, at 544-45.
278. See id.
279. Bias in enforcement proceedings is not a rare occurrence. See, e.g., Boris
Karabelnikov & Dominic Pellew, Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards in Russia-
Still a Mixed Picture, 19 ICC BULL. 65 (2008).
280. See infra Part IV.F.
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no reason to discriminate or disadvantage the plaintiff.2"'
The grounds for review would need to be slightly adapted
from the traditional model. Courts would obviously not control
whether the jurisdiction of the arbitrators was properly defined
in an arbitration agreement. Instead, they would control
whether the requirements for the proposed model-in particu-
lar, those relating to its scope-were met.28 2 For the rest, the
same grounds for review would remain. First, courts would sanc-
tion the violation of procedural fairness. I submit that arbitral
tribunals usually offer the protection and the process as ade-
quate as those offered by the courts. However, when that is not
the case, parties ought to have a remedy, if only to give an addi-
tional incentive to arbitrators to offer a fair process. Second,
courts would not review arbitral awards on the merits. The pro-
posed model recognizes that arbitration is the preferred mode
of international dispute resolution. As such, it should be the de-
fault solution and prevent any court from deciding the case. If
the reviewing court had the power to review the award on the
merits, it would indirectly decide the dispute. The proposed
model would thus deny reviewing courts the power to review
awards on the merits, allowing only the public policy exception
to remain.
C. Unavailability of the New York Convention
The critical importance of the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
("New York Convention") 211 in the development of international
commercial arbitration raises the issue of the consequences that
the proposed model would have on its application. The New
York Convention has long been credited with the success of in-
ternational commercial arbitration. 2 4 This is because it ensures
281. In the worst case scenario, the defendant would have no assets anywhere else,
and the plaintiff would not be able to enforce the award. This seems to result in a
denial of justice, but it is not a new phenomenon in the international arena. In all
likelihood, the plaintiff would not have been able to enforce a foreign judgment, ei-
ther.
282. See supra Part IV.A.
283. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (adopted June 10, 1958), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html [hereinafter New York Convention].
284. See, e.g., Alan Redfern, Having Confidence in International Arbitration, 57 Disp.
RESOL. J. 60, 61 (2003); see also the surveys conducted by BoRHING-UHLE, supra note 20,
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high probability of enforcement of arbitral awards even outside
of the jurisdiction where they were made.285 The New York Con-
vention limits the grounds for denial of enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, thus creating a duty to enforce them in most
circumstances. Since the New York Convention was ratified by
most countries, it applies almost universally as does the obliga-
tion to enforce foreign arbitral awards.28 6 In contrast, there are
few treaties ensuring the recognition of foreign judgments.28 7
For many, this gives a sufficient incentive to prefer arbitration to
litigation to resolve international disputes.28 8
It seems likely, however, that the proposed model could not
benefit from the New York Convention. The New York Conven-
tion only applies to the arbitral awards by a tribunal which has
jurisdiction under an arbitration agreement. Although the Con-
vention does not define the meaning of arbitration for the pur-
pose of its application, several of its provisions clearly indicate
that an agreement to arbitrate must have been concluded by the
parties. Article IV of the Convention provides that the party
seeking enforcement of an award shall supply the original agree-
ment to arbitrate. Article V also seems to assume the existence
of an agreement to arbitrate when it allows contracting states to
refuse enforcement of the award upon evidence that the agree-
ment to arbitrate was not valid or that the award decides a dis-
pute which was not contemplated by the "terms of the submis-
sion to arbitration." Of course, one cannot rule out the possibil-
at 109 (finding that the international enforceability of decisions is one of the two main
advantages of international commercial arbitration), and by Mistelis, supra note 20, at
543 (finding that the international enforceability of awards is one of the top three rea-
sons why corporations opt for arbitration).
285. In the words of William Park, the New York Convention gives international
currency to arbitral awards. See PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra
note 20, at 299.
286. See id.
287. One of the most efficient regional treaties was the 1968 Brussels Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
O.J. L 304/77 (1978), adopted by members of the European Union. It has now been
replaced by Council Regulation No. 44/2001, O.J. L 12/1 (2001). For the purpose of
this Article, the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreement (Convention
on Choice of Courts Agreement, 30 June 2005, 64 I.L.M. 1294) is not relevant because
it assumes an agreement on competent court.
288. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 1, at 2; see also Born, supra note 20, at 71
(arguing that, in the absence of a global counterpart to the New York Convention for
foreign judgments, international arbitral awards are more likely than national court
judgments to put the parties' dispute to rest).
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ity that the New York Convention could be amended if the
proposed model were widely accepted. For the time being, how-
ever, this does not appear to be a realistic expectation. In recent
years, the New York Convention has increasingly appeared as a
limit to the development of the law of international arbitration.
Many fear that any attempt to revise it not only is bound to fail,
but also could offer an opportunity for quite a few countries to
renounce the New York Convention altogether.289
Thus, a consequence of the proposed model may be to lose
the benefits of this international treaty. Does it make the model
any less desirable? No, it does not, because the alternative would
not be traditional arbitration. As a default rule, the new model
would apply in the absence of any agreement as to a competent
adjudicator. Rather, the alternative would be litigation before a
national court. An award likely to benefit from the New York
Convention merely is not an option.
D. Confidentiality
Traditionally, confidentiality has been presented as one of
the principal advantages of arbitration.29 ° Yet, its scope and ac-
tual existence have long been debated in many jurisdictions. 291
As far as the publication of awards is concerned, recent develop-
ments in certain specialized fields of arbitration have shown that
confidentiality has now become the exception rather than the
norm.292 It is not in the very nature of arbitration to be confi-
dential.
In the proposed model, none of the actors of the arbitral
process would have a duty to observe confidentiality. It must be
recalled that, as the parties would not have agreed to go to arbi-
289. For example, members of the working group willing to soften the require-
ment that arbitration agreements be in writing (Article II of the Convention) expressed
concerns regarding the risk of initiating the revision of the Convention. See Renaud
Sorieul, UNCITRAL's Current Work in the Field of International Commercial Arbitration, 22 J.
INr'L ARB. 543, 551 (2005); see generally Toby Landau, The Requirement of a Written Form
For an Arbitration Agreement: When "Written" means "Oral", 11 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 19
(2003) (arguing that the written form requirement, although a tangible problem in the
world of international commercial arbitration, is not sufficiently significant to warrant
tampering with the New York Convention).
290. See generally POUDRET & BESSON, supra note 169, at 315-20.
291. See id. at 315.
292. Most arbitral awards rendered in the fields of investment and sport arbitra-
tion are available to the public within a few days after being made. See supra notes 185-
94 and accompanying text.
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tration, the alternative would be to resolve the dispute in public
proceedings entertained by a court. As the proposed model
would potentially decrease the number of international commer-
cial cases decided by courts, it would be important to make avail-
able the decisions of the arbitrators. In principle, thus, awards
could be made public.
It could also be envisaged to make the proceedings and the
hearing public. It is unclear whether it would really bring much
in most commercial cases. A reasonable solution could be to in-
vest the arbitral tribunal to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether to open the hearing to the public, and to allow a review
of such decision by the court of the seat of the arbitration.293
E. Traditional Rules Flowing from the Contractual
Foundation of Arbitration
While most of the rules existing in the traditional model
could be kept in the proposed model, certain rules of interna-
tional arbitration are direct consequences of the contractual
foundation of the traditional model. For instance, arbitration
raises a variety of issues in respect of third parties, who can
neither be joined nor intervene in the proceedings because they
are not parties to the arbitration agreement. 294 At the very least,
the proposed model would require reconsidering such rules-
they could be kept, but they could also be amended.
It happens to be that many such rules are widely perceived
as limiting the efficacy of the arbitral process, and as such as
necessary evils. One of the best examples is precisely the rule
preventing joinder of third parties absent the agreement of all
parties concerned.295 In practice, this has most often meant that
arbitration could not cope properly with multi-party disputes. 296
So, modifying the rule and allowing arbitration to deal more effi-
ciently with multi-party disputes would not be regretted by
293. Obviously, a critical factor to consider would be whether constitutional guar-
antees actually require such publicity. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights
art. 6, Nov. 4, 1950 (requiring a public hearing which, however, can be waived by the
parties). This is why the provision does not apply in traditional consensual arbitration.
See, e.g., Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) App. No. 6903/75 at § 49 (Feb 27,
1980); Suovaniemi v. Finland, No. 31737/96 (Feb. 23, 1999).
294. See generally HANOTIAU, supra note 1, at 166.
295. For more on the joinder rule and rulings in the arbitral proceedings, see
I'ANOTIAU, supra note 1, at 165-77.
296. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 170, at 25
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many.297 The new paradigm will actually lead to an improve-
ment of the arbitral process.
F. The Seat of the Arbitration
The seat of the arbitration carries important legal conse-
291quences. 98 Under most national laws, it is the court of the seat
of the arbitration that has jurisdiction to entertain challenges to
the award, or to support the arbitral process when one of the
parties does not fully cooperate. The law of arbitration in that
jurisdiction also controls most of the issues which may arise dur-
ing the process, and which could thus be sanctioned at the stage
of the review of the award. For this reason, the seat of the arbi-
tration is generally chosen by the parties.2 9 When they have
made no such choice, arbitral regimes empower either the arbi-
tral institution..0 or the arbitral tribunal itself30" to make this de-
termination.
In a non-consensual model of international arbitration, the
parties would not have the opportunity to choose the seat of the
arbitration in a prior agreement. They may be able to reach an
agreement in this respect at the beginning of the arbitral pro-
ceedings, but it would be unrealistic to expect this to be the rule.
For the same reason, it would be unrealistic to rely on an arbitral
institution, since the absence of a prior agreement would mean
that, in the vast majority of cases, the parties would not agree on
resorting to any specific kind of arbitration, which would gener-
ally exclude institutional arbitration.
Thus, there are only two options for the determination of
the seat in the non-consensual international arbitration. The
first would be to confer this power to the arbitral tribunal, along
with many national laws and institutional rules.30 2 The second
297. See, e.g., Born, supra note 20, at 69; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 170, at 25.
298. See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 170, at 83. But see GALIARD &
SAVAGE, supra note 5, at 674.
299. For instance, the International Chamber of Commerce reports that the par-
ties chose a seat in more than 80% of the cases referred to ICC arbitration. See, e.g.,
2006 Statistical Report, 18 ICC ICARB. BULL. 12 (2007) (86.6% in 2006); 2005 Statistical
Report, 17 ICC ICARB. BULL. 10 (2006) (87.4% in 2005).
300. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, art. 14
(1998).
301. See, e.g., English Arbitration Act, art. 3; 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, art.
20(1) (1985); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 16 (1976).
302. See infra note 304.
2009]
486 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:417
would be to confer this power to any court requested to enforce
a party's right to go to arbitration. The second solution has sev-
eral drawbacks, however, which may explain why no arbitration
regime has retained it. First, it confers the power to make an
important decision to a court, while the fundamental motivation
to choose arbitration is precisely to involve courts as little as pos-
sible in resolving the dispute. Second, relying on courts to deter-
mine the seat of jurisdiction would give jurisdiction to several
courts and could result in conflicting decisions.
The arbitration regimes that have conferred the power to
choose the seat of the arbitration to the arbitral tribunal have
given it wide discretion, providing merely that it should have re-
gard to the "circumstances" of the case.30 3 This seems to stem
from the unwillingness of sophisticated jurisdictions to get in-
volved in the arbitral process. Yet, some guidance could be
found in the practice of institutions such as the International
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC Court"), which has a wide experience in fixing the place
of the arbitration absent an agreement of the parties.3 ' 4 The
ICC Court weighs a number of factors in making such deci-
sion.3°3 First and foremost, the ICC Court seeks a seat that the
parties will perceive as neutral. This means that, in most cases, it
will not situate the arbitration in either of the parties' countries
of origin. Additionally, the ICC Court evaluates the local law re-
garding international arbitration, in order to ensure that the
award would not be at risk of being nullified for lack of compli-
ance with a particular local rule and that local courts are not
likely to intervene in the arbitral process if requested to do so.
Finally, the ICC Court takes into consideration the convenience
of the place for all parties involved. States implementing my
model could adopt a rule directing arbitrators to determine the
seat along those lines.
303. See 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, art. 20(1) ("[T]he circumstances of the
case, including the convenience of the parties."); English Arbitration Act, art. 3 ("[A]II
the relevant circumstances.").
304. See generally YvEs DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF
ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2005).
305. See id. 212-15; SigvardJarvin, The Place of Arbitration: A Review of the ICC Court's
Guiding Principles and Practices when Fixing the Place of Arbitration, 7 ICC BULL. 55 (1996);
Herman Verbist, The Practice of the ICC International Court of Arbitration with Regard to the
Fixing of the Place of Arbitration, 12 ARB. INT'L 347 (1996).
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V. IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of such a model of non-consensual ar-
bitration would not be easy. The most direct path would be the
negotiation of an international convention whereby contracting
states would undertake to amend their national laws in order to
adopt the model. Is it realistic? One could argue that the foun-
dation of the modern law of international commercial arbitra-
tion is precisely an international treaty, the New York Conven-
tion, which has been widely ratified. However, recent attempts
to amend the New York Convention have shown that the dy-
namic which once led so many states to join the scheme of the
convention and to consent to this mode of legislation has faded
away. Not only is amending the Convention perceived as an im-
possible achievement, but many fear that contracting states
would actually take advantage of a process of renegotiation to
free themselves from the international scheme.3" 6 The pros-
pects of negotiating a new international treaty appear to be
rather low.
It is thus likely that the implementation of the model would
come from unilateral initiatives. States would unilaterally amend
their legislation in order to make arbitration available in the ab-
sence of any agreement on dispute resolution. Three incentives
could lead them to do so. First, some states may wish to differen-
tiate themselves from others in the competition to attract the
economic benefits of international arbitration. Such differentia-
tion can be achieved by sending signals that their law is favorable
to international arbitration. The adoption of the model could
be one such signal, or at least part of a broader operation of
signalling a pro-arbitration policy.
Second, some states may wish to benefit from the decrease
in the caseload of their courts that would result from the adop-
tion of the proposed model. For instance, they may wish to find
an appropriate alternative for suits initiated by non-members of
their community, especially for disputes remotely connected to
the forum. In common law jurisdictions, the model would thus
become an alternative to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Instead of declining jurisdiction and effectively obliging the par-
ties to go and litigate before foreign courts, common law courts
306. For an example, see supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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would refer to arbitration. Unlike doctrines such as forum non
conveniens or international abstention, the model would offer a
truly impartial adjudication rather than a foreign process which
might not offer all the necessary procedural guarantees.3 ° v
Finally, some states may want to afford a better system of
dispute resolution to non-members of the community. An im-
portant incentive would be reciprocity. States may want to nego-
tiate reciprocal obligations to offer such benefit to each other's
nationals. Technically, the model would be implemented by in-
cluding a clause in bilateral treaties of protection of foreign ac-
tivity in the jurisdiction of each state. There are, for instance,
thousands of BITs affording specific protection to foreign inves-
tors.30 8 From a jurisdictional point of view, these treaties only
offer a right to, sue the host state before various adjudicators,
including arbitral tribunals." 9 They could also offer a right to
initiate arbitral proceedings against other parties, whether pub-
lic or private. It is important to underline that, as virtually all
these treaties include a Most Favored Nation clause, 310 one such
benefit given to foreign investors of one nationality by one treaty
would immediately extend to foreign investors of all states with
which the two contracting states would have concluded other bi-
lateral treaties. As the development of foreign investment law in
the last twenty years has shown, this is not unrealistic.
307. Although a traditional requirement of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is
that the foreign court be a suitable alternative forum, U.S. courts have generally re-
jected claims of foreign bias. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 352 (3d ed. 1996).
308. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
309. See id.
310. On the Most Favored Nation clause, see supra note 205.
